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ABSTRACT 
A consensus exists that the current trend of energy consumption growth and CO2 
emissions cannot continue if global warming is to be tackled. Carbon Capture and 
Storage (CCS) has been considered in many countries for addressing climate 
change. CCS is a technology that curbs CO2 emission by removing CO2 from the 
atmosphere and storing it in carbon sinks, such as depleted oil and gas fields.  
     CCS is a controversial technology. Notable opposition to and different 
perceptions of the technology exist among stakeholders, including experts, 
politicians and laypeople. Therefore, it is important to understand these diverse 
perceptions and their roots. I have developed a means towards such an 
understanding. I show that national culture influences both laypeople and expert 
perceptions. Moreover, it seems likely that cultural orientation affects some of the 
other factors, such as trust. In addition, I show that although mainstream research 
and literature consider experts as unbiased and rational stakeholders, both 
laypeople and experts have similar underlying cultural features and thus their 
models of perception follow a similar trend in a society. I specify how cultural 
orientations and their characteristics shape the perception of CCS technology and 
influence the reactions of people. For instance, hierarchical nations with high 
uncertainty avoidance have a tendency towards a higher level of risk perception. In 
contrast, nations that are characterised by social harmony might have a lower level 
of risk perception of a technology that could increase the long-term quality of life.  
     This research is a comparative study; comparisons were performed between 
countries and between laypeople and experts. I used mixed methods to address the 
research questions. The quantitative part of the study is based on survey data 
analysis and the qualitative part involves both discourse analysis of interviews and 
Function of Innovations Systems (FIS) analysis.  
     This research contributes to risk governance of CCS by developing a new 
framework that policymakers and authorities can use as a tool to consider the 
unheeded issue of culture in their planning.  I demonstrate who is concerned with 
what and why with respect to the technology. Finally, I discuss the implications of 
this study, including policy recommendations. For instance, the European 
Commission might plausibly benefit from the framework when considering its 
budget allocation and communication with member states to study CCS projects 
and to estimate the failure or success of a project. 
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Det råder en enighet om att om den globala uppvärmningen ska kunna
stävjas, så kan inte den nuvarande trenden med allt ökande energikonsumtion och
koldioxidutsläpp fortsätta. Geologisk lagring av koldioxid (CCS, Carbon Capture
and Storage) har på senare tid blivit ett populärt sätt att bekämpa
klimatförändringen i många länder. CCS är en teknologi med hjälp av vilken man
kan stävja koldioxidutsläpp genom att först avlägsna koldioxiden från atmosfären
och sedan lagra den i kolsänkor såsom tömda olje- och gasfält.
 CCS är en kontroversiell teknologi. Det förekommer mycket motstånd mot, 
och olika uppfattningar kring, teknologin bland experter, politiker och lekmän. 
Det är därför viktigt att förstå bakgrunden till de olika uppfattningarna. I 
avhandlingen utvecklar jag ett sätt att närma sig en sådan förståelse. Jag visar hur 
den nationella kulturen påverkar både lekmännens och experternas uppfattningar 
om CCS. Det verkar dessutom troligt att vissa andra faktorer såsom 
förtroende påverkas av kulturell orientering. Därutöver visar jag – trots att gängse 
forskning anser experter vara opartiska och rationella parter – att både 
lekmän och experter uppvisar liknande underliggande kulturella drag, och att 
deras modeller för varseblivningen därmed följer en liknande trend i samhället. I 
min avhandling specificerar jag hur kulturell orientering med tillhörande 
särdrag formar uppfattningen av CCS- teknologin och hur den påverkar 
människornas reaktioner. Hierarkiska nationer som värdesätter undvikande av 
osäkerhet högt tenderar till exempel att uppfatta också graden av risk som högre. 
I kontrast härtill kan nationer som kännetecknas av social harmoni uppvisa en 
lägre grad av uppfattad risk då det gäller en teknologi som kan öka livskvaliteten 
på lång sikt.
 Denna forskning utgör en jämförande studie: mellan länder, och mellan lekmän
och experter. För att adressera forskningsfrågorna använder jag mig av en
blandning av kvantitativa och kvalitativa metoder. Den kvantitativa delen av
studien är baserad på analysen av data från en surveyundersökning. Den kvalitativa
delen av studien innefattar både diskursanalys av intervjuer och FIS-analys
(Functions of Innovations Systems).
 Forskningen bidrar till riskhanteringen av CCS-teknologin genom att utveckla
ett nytt ramverk, som kan användas som redskap då beslutsfattare och myndigheter
vill adressera den hittills ofta ouppmärksammade frågan om kultur i
planeringsverksamheten. Jag visar vem som är oroad över vad gällande CCS-
teknologin, och varför. Slutligen diskuterar jag vilka slutsatser man kan dra av min
forskning, inklusive rekommendationer och politiska riktlinjer. Till exempel kan
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Europeiska Kommissionen dra nytta av ramverket i samband med budgetanslag 
samt i kommunikationen med medlemsländer då det gäller att sätta sig in i CCS-
projekt eller att bedöma deras grad av framgång respektive misslyckande.   
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1 INTRODUCTION 
A consensus exists that the current trend of energy consumption growth and CO2 
emissions cannot continue in the future if climate change is to be tackled. In 
confronting the problem of global warming, the choice today is between immediate 
action and delay. Immediate action is based on scaling available mitigation 
technologies up to what is needed to avoid disastrous climate change impacts. 
Delay, on the other hand, would provide time to develop new, revolutionary 
mitigation strategies. Recently, Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) has become the 
centre of attention in some countries as part of their transition to sustainable energy 
policy. The technology aims to mitigate CO2 emissions and is critical for climate 
change management, principally in the medium term, given the high cost of 
renewable energy in combination with deceptively sufficient amounts of fossil fuel. 
However, notable opposition to the technology exists among experts, politicians 
and laypeople. Therefore, it is important to understand the diversity of perceptions 
and their roots. In this study, I have developed a means towards such an 
understanding. 
     In studies of risk perception and acceptability of climate change-related 
technologies, the emphasis has been mostly on factors such as supplying 
information and the information-deficit model (e.g., McDaniels et al. 1996; Sturgis 
and Allum 2004; Tokushige et al. 2007; Brunsting et al. 2013), knowledge 
dissemination (e.g., O’Connor et al. 1998; O’Connor et al. 1999; Bord et al. 2000; 
Wallquist et al. 2010; Brunsting et al. 2013), trust (e.g., Earle and Siegrist 2008; 
Midden and Huijts 2009; Brulle et al. 2012; Terwel et al. 2011;Yang et al. 2016) 
and community characteristics (Braun 2017; Krause et al. 2014; Haug and Stigson 
2016; ter Mors and Groeneweg 2016; Terwel and ter Mors 2015; Terwel et al. 
2014; Zaal et al. 2014; ter Mors et al. 2014; ter Mors et al. 2012; Terwel and 
Daamen 2012; Brunsting et al. 2011). While these elements are crucial, a missing 
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piece of the jigsaw has not yet been supplied in a sufficiently clear manner to 
enable full understanding of the phenomena. I show how national cultural 
orientation plays an important role compared to other factors. I argue that national 
culture influences both laypeople’s and experts’ perceptions and also that cultural 
orientation affects other factors such as trust. Moreover, although mainstream 
research and literature consider experts as unbiased and rational stakeholders, I will 
demonstrate that both laypeople and experts have similar underlying cultural 
features and thus their perception models follow a similar trend in a given society. 
The hypothesis is that laypeople and experts are affected by similar cultural factors. 
     I develop a new theoretical and applied framework to provide a tool for 
policymakers, authorities and energy companies to operationalise risk perception 
by utilising the overlooked issue of national culture to understand how to address 
risks and uncertainties of a new energy technology in the analysis and planning of a 
project. I have a precise pragmatic objective in this dissertation: to operationalise 
CSS risk perceptions in different cultural contexts. Broad literature exists on the 
social aspects of the risks and uncertainties of new technology, but this literature 
often leaves professional planners baffled as to how they should proceed with their 
work.  
     This dissertation has five chapters. In the remainder of this chapter, I discuss the 
background of the study and present an overview of CCS. Then, I present the 
objectives and a summary of the articles. In Chapter 2, I present the theoretical and 
analytical background of the dissertation including a discussion on cultural studies 
in Section 2.2. Chapter 3 concerns the methodology of the dissertation and 
presentation of data. I present the results and findings of the study in Chapter 4. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I discuss the conclusion of the dissertation and its policy 
implications, followed by caveats and some suggestions for future research. 
1.1 CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE: AN OVERVIEW 
To tackle climate change, CCS is needed not only because energy reliance on fossil 
fuels will continue (IEA 2015), but also because CCS curbs CO2 emissions from 
industries such as cement and steel production. The Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) (2013) report has emphasised that it is not possible to 
‘limit likely warming to below 2°C if bioenergy, CCS, and their combination 
(BECCS) are limited’, while IEA (2016) has stated that ‘CCS must be part of a 
strengthened global climate response’. I took it as axiomatic that CCS technology 
is part of the energy transition scenarios. In other words, I follow Pacala’s and 
Socolow’s precautionary ‘wedge approach’, which argues that we are able to tackle 
climate change in 50 years with current technologies (Pacala and Socolow, 2004). 
Pacala and Socolow identify 15 stabilisation wedges that, if deployed at a 
significant global scale, could each conceivably reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions by 1GtC/ year. I focus on one of these 15 wedges, CCS, which could 
help to prevent about 90% of the fossil carbon from reaching the atmosphere. The 
introduction of CCS at all coal plants producing 800 GW/year or at natural gas 
plants producing 1600 GW/year would, theoretically, reduce emissions by 1 
GtC/year (ibid).  
     The first step in the study of risk perception of technology is to understand the 
functions, development, progress and status of the technology. Therefore, my co-
authors and I have presented an introduction to the social, technological and 
environmental issues of CCS in Article I by focusing on a case study of the CCS 
frontrunner country, Norway. CCS has been called a key component in the toolkit 
to combat climate change in almost all low-carbon scenarios, including the IPCC’s 
scenarios (IPCC 2005) and those of the International Energy Agency (IEA 2009; 
2016). Nonetheless, mixed and ambivalent stances exist towards the technology 
among different stakeholders and countries. Many countries, especially those that 
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still depend on coal for energy production, have been enthusiastic about the 
technology, and companies involved in coal power have been keen to explore CCS 
as a climate-friendly option and a hedge against potential carbon taxes or emission 
trading schemes. In Europe, the Netherlands, Norway and the UK are prominent 
examples of countries where CCS has been pushed by governments.  
     CCS technology consists of three separate parts: capturing CO2 from the 
emissions of a fossil fuel-based power plant or an industrial facility, transporting 
CO2 to a suitable storage site and storing it permanently, most commonly 
underground and offshore, usually in depleted oil and gas fields (Figure 1). This 
would eliminate a large part of the emissions usually associated with energy 
production and industry, and allow, in an ideal case, the targets of the climate 
change conference’s protocol(s) to be met without drastically changing the current 
behaviour in the energy sector (Huijts et al. 2007). 
     Carbon capture is the most technologically challenging and cost-intensive part 
of the process. This part can be performed in different forms, namely pre-
combustion, post-combustion and oxy-fuel (Global CCS Institute, 2017). Pre-
combustion is the most mature technology and can be applied to existing power 
plants (IPCC 2005). Post-combustion is a ‘runner-up’ technology suitable for new 
power plants. This method is mainly based on the process of gasification, which 
leads to the formation of ‘syngas’ (ibid). In oxy-fuel combustion, nitrogen is 
removed from flue gas by mixing the pure oxygen with fuel for combustion, 
instead of mixing it with air (nitrogen is one of the main components of air). Since 
the nitrogen concentration is the highest in the flue gas, oxygen is the key factor for 
this technology (ibid).   
     Two main methods exist for CO2 transportation: pipeline and shipping. In 
addition to these two methods, which refer to large-scale transportation, another 
alternative exists, namely transportation by truck. This method has been used 
mostly for very small CO2 amounts and to close destinations (Article I).  
The last part of the technology concerns storage. The storage phase is one of the 
most controversial parts of the CCS due to the large uncertainty involved, 
especially regarding the possibility of gas leakage. There are several options for 
CO2 storage. These include geological storage, ocean storage, storage in terrestrial 
ecosystems and storage in mineral carbonation. Geological storage is the most 
mature and advanced option for CO2 storage that has already been used on a 
commercial scale. Some of the reserves have a capacity of gigatons for storing 
CO2. Geological storage can be categorised into five major options (Kerr et al. 
2007): depleted oil and gas reservoirs, Enhanced Oil Recovery (EOR), enhanced 
gas recovery, Enhanced Coal Bed Methane recovery (ECBM) and saline aquifers. 
Ocean storage is in the research phase. In mineral carbonation storage, CO2 is 
converted to solid carbonates by chemical reactions with oxides or silicates of 
magnesium, calcium and iron. The final products are compounds such as 
magnesium carbonate (MgCO3) and calcium carbonate (CaCO3). 
     Altogether, CCS is an assemblage of technologies, and all three parts are more 
or less based on technological solutions in use in other fields. Flue gas treatments 
are common, CO2 is already transported in pipes and ships because it is used in 
industrial processes and CO2 is used in Enhanced Oil and Gas Recovery to extract 
the most out of oil and gas fields at the end of their life cycle. However, the 
combination and scale of technologies involved is novel, and there are proposed 
alternatives for each of the parts that are sometimes entirely new, such as storing 
the gas in solid carbonates that potentially have other uses. Each part of CCS 
technology is at rather a high level of technological know-how, but some industrial 
actors do not yet consider the whole system to be readily available and 
commercially viable for large-scale deployment. The main concern regards overall 
cost, but large uncertainties remain related to future policy instruments, life-cycle 
performance and public acceptance. CO2 capture requires high investment costs, 
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and because of its high costs and complex infrastructure, CCS is by necessity 
suited primarily for centralised, large-scale power stations or large industrial 
facilities (such as cement and steel factories).  
Figure 1. CCS chain and its technological solutions 
     Currently, 21 large-scale1 CCS projects are running or under construction 
around the world (Figure 2), with a total capacity for capturing 40 million tons of 
CO2 per annum (Mtpa) (Global CCS Institute, 2016b). However, only five of these 
projects utilise geological CO2 storage (ibid).  
Figure 2. Number and history of existing large-scale CCS projects (data from the Global CCS 
Institute 2016a) 
1 A project with the capacity of at least 800,000 t CO2 /year for a coal–based power plant (Global 
CCS Institute, 2016a). 
1.2 CCS: THE DEBATE 
CCS is controversial. Four main areas of uncertainty exist (Article I). 
Technological uncertainties relate to matters including storage security, 
transportation, monitoring issues, and energy demand for capturing CO2.  
Economic uncertainties primarily concern the high cost of implementation and the 
lack of funding. Political uncertainties include carbon policies, regulatory 
frameworks for CCS and long-term liability. Last are the societal uncertainties, 
such as social acceptability and social acceptance. My co-authors and I specify all 
four categories of problems in Article I.  
     In brief, according to CCS opponents the number and location of safe reservoirs 
are primary concerns. Storage possibilities are restricted, even though from a 
technical perspective there appears to be enough capacity to store global CO2
emissions for many decades. Yet much uncertainty exists about the suitability of 
the various storage options, and much societal opposition arises once a specific 
storage site has been selected (Huijts et al. 2007). Moreover, opponents are 
concerned about the risk of a gas leakage (large or small) and warn against the 
hazards of seismic activity due to underground pressure change resulting from 
geological storage. Furthermore, the lack of social acceptability and technological 
lock-in are two major socio-economic concerns. Opponents express fears that 
governments will not make enough effort to promote sustainable solutions if they 
employ CCS. As argued by Spreng et al. (2007, 853), ‘CCS could provide 
temporary relief, but it may also make the whole of humankind more dependent on 
fossil fuels, and thus make a change-over later more difficult’. 
     Proponents, however, argue that because electricity producers consider 
renewable energy sources as not yet commercially viable or technically ready for 
large-scale application, carbon-based fuels will continue to dominate the energy 
scene for the larger part of this century (Huijts et al. 2007). Tsouris and Aaron 
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(2010) argued that ‘fossil fuels are just too easy to use. The physical, social and 
legislative infrastructures are well established. The energy concentration is too 
dense for an energy hungry world to ignore, even if finding new deposits of light 
oil (and gas) is getting ever more difficult’. With this continued reliance on fossil 
fuels, CCS is a major instrument to cut emissions. The IPCC affirmed that ‘among 
other things, scenarios show that CCS may come to contribute with 15–55% of the 
cumulative mitigation effort worldwide until 2100 and that the inclusion of CCS in 
a mitigation portfolio is found to reduce the costs of stabilising CO2 concentrations 
by 30% or more’ (IPCC 2005, p.12).  
     Hansson and Bryngelsson (2009) argued that as coal is the cheapest and most 
abundant source of energy in poorer countries (i.e., the largest regions of the 
world), CCS will be the only solution for sustainable development; nonetheless, it 
needs a significant cost reduction to be viable. They go as far as stating that ‘with 
the anticipated effects of global warming, in combination with the lacking 
adaptation capabilities in developing countries, a future without CCS could even 
mean mass migration and war according to a few respondents’ (ibid, p. 2277). 
CCS, in their view, must be regarded as a ‘bridging’ technology that helps meet 
emission targets while buying time to develop more long-term solutions in the form 
of more revolutionary renewable energy technology. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND OBJECTIVES 
The study of a sustainable energy regime is not limited to engineering questions, 
but also includes social and political issues. Indeed, I argue that the engineering 
questions themselves are framed and shaped by such social and political issues. In 
this research, I therefore scrutinised the controversial and developing CCS 
technology from a cultural perspective.  
     The perception of risk and acceptability of technology are the main issues and 
have to be carefully considered in risk governance of CCS and, more generally, in 
every new climate change-related technology. Moreover, the reaction of the public 
and experts to CCS will considerably affect the development of the technology 
(Perdan et al. 2017; Upham et al. 2015; Terwel and Daamen 2012; Wallquist et al. 
2010; Terwel et al. 2009a). Terwel (2009) posits that public acceptance of CCS 
depends on people’s trust in the stakeholders rather than the benefits of the 
technology. However, by making reference to the notable works of Thompson and 
Wildavsky (1982), Douglas and Wildavsky (1983), Wildavsky and Dake (1990), I 
suggest that a macro-factor exists—national culture—which helps to understand 
how such trust is constructed in a society and also to capture the relationship 
between laypeople’s and experts’ stances towards the technology. Furthermore, 
experts’ views on CCS have not been sufficiently studied; the current assumption is 
that experts usually have homogeneous understanding and recognition of climate 
change-related technology and its risks and benefits. 
     A knowledge gap exists in understanding the relationship between the pattern of 
laypeople’s and experts’ risk perception and macro-level societal factors affecting 
it. For instance, Ashworth et al. (2013) show that despite sharing the same concerns 
and having been exposed to the same information about CCS, citizens from 
different countries tend to adopt different perceptions of the technology. Similarly, 
Pietzner et al. (2011) conducted a representative survey in six EU countries to 
assess public awareness and perceptions of CCS and concluded that public 
perceptions and awareness of CCS vary considerably in different countries. 
However, the authors of both studies did not discuss the causes of these 
discrepancies.  Furthermore, Jasanoff (1987) shows that risk perception of experts 
about a same issue are varied between countries while the perception is largely the 
same among experts within a country. Jasanoff attributes this phenomenon to 
‘social context’. In contrast to Jasanoff (1987), Ashworth et al. (2013) and Pietzner 
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et al. (2011), Upham and Roberts (2011) report only minor differences in opinion 
of the participants in the focus group (N=56) from six countries in their research. 
Furthermore, a review of 42 research articles on public perception of CCS by Seigo 
et al. (2014) recommends further research on the role of social context and values 
in the deployment of CCS.  
     I argue that cross-cultural factors have been overlooked, and in risk perception 
studies of CCS the emphasis has mainly been on supplying information, 
communication, knowledge dissemination and trust per se (e.g.Yang et al. 2016; 
Dowd et al. 2014; Gough et al. 2014; Itaoka et al. 2013; Terwel et al. 2011; 
Brunsting et al. 2011; 2012; Terwel 2009; Itaoka et al. 2009; Tokushige et al. 2007; 
Huijts et al. 2007). These are crucial factors but they do not reveal the full picture, 
as demonstrated by the unexplained country differences observed in some of the 
reviewed studies.  
     Moreover, despite extensive research on the social sciences of CCS (e.g., 
Meadowcroft and Langhelle 2009; Markusson et al. 2012; van Alphen et al. 2010, 
2010a, 2009, 2007) and the role of culture in the perception or deployment of the 
technology (e.g., Bradbury 2012; Oltra et al. 2012; Wallquist et al. 2012a; Seigo et 
al. 2014a), the available studies barely incorporate explicit cultural variables (Evar 
2012; Warren et al. 2014). For instance, Bradbury (2012) discusses public 
perception of CCS by analysing six CCS projects in the US. Her broad conclusion 
is that for the deployment of CCS, ‘differences in social and cultural framework’ 
must be accommodated. Oltra et al. (2012) identify six factors affecting the public 
reactions to CCS based on case studies of five EU CCS projects: socio-political 
context, community characteristics, risk perceptions, project characteristics, the 
engagement process and actions of stakeholders and interactions of the procedures. 
Oltra et al. (2012) refer to the role of cultural orientations in risk perception of new 
technologies by making reference to Wildavsky and Dake (1990). Nonetheless, 
they do not indicate the role of national culture and cross-cultural differences and 
the way they affect the risk perception of CCS in specific and new technology in 
general.  
     Wallquist et al. (2012a) recommend further research on the role of value-based 
trust in various contexts and on other beliefs that explain variance in risk 
perceptions of CCS. Dowd et al. (2014) refer to the effects of values that people 
hold on the benefit perception of CCS without further elucidation. Seigo et al. 
(2014a) also state that ‘cultural context’ might affect CCS risk perception and 
hence propose further research in a cross-country framework. In sum, hardly any of 
the existing literature explicitly sheds light on the role of national cultural features 
in the perception of and reactions to the deployment of the technology in line with 
the other factors. 
     In this research, I draw upon cross-cultural studies to understand the issues in 
more detail. My argument is that risk perception of novel technologies is not the 
simple case of information and knowledge dissemination that has been highlighted 
in some research (e.g., Brunsting et al. 2013; Pietzner et al. 2011; Wallquist et al. 
2010; Tokushige et al. 2007; Sturgis and Allum 2004; Bord et al. 2000; O’Connor 
et al. 1999; O’Connor et al. 1998; McDaniels et al. 1996). Instead, it is a more 
complex process, incorporating cultural factors such as the degree of separation 
between groups, the strength of institutions over space, time and social roles and 
the society’s tolerance for uncertainty and ambiguity (Article II). Nonetheless, 
important studies exist on risk and culture, which I discuss further in section 2.1, 
emphasising the novelty and nuances of my dissertation in comparison with the 
existing mainstream studies. The nuances are the ways in which I approach and 
understand culture and utilise it for risk perception of CCS.  
     To achieve the goals of this dissertation, I address the following research 
questions:  
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? How does national culture influence the risk and benefit perceptions of 
CCS?  
? To what extent do cross-cultural factors predict the public reaction to the 
implementation of CCS? 
? How do expert concerns and risk perceptions of CCS projects differ across 
countries? 
     In the first stage of the study (Article I), I show the socio-technical and 
regulatory development of CCS in all aspects using the case study of Norway (one 
of the frontrunners of this technology) by focusing on two major, well-known 
projects,  Mongstad and Kårstø. I discuss how even such a progressive country 
ended in a deadlock, and demonstrate why CCS is a controversial technology and 
demands more research if we take up the IPCC’s (2013) assertion. I also propose a 
taxonomy of stakeholders in the CCS field, which I use in Article IV. Furthermore, 
this article provides support for the arguments about Norway in Article IV and 
other factors that influence perception of the technology. Next (Article II), I discuss 
how national culture plays a particular role in risk perception compared to other 
factors. On the basis of this analysis, I provide a framework for analysts and 
policymakers wishing to understand why and how societies and social actors 
challenge technology and energy regimes (Article III). I explicitly argue and 
demonstrate that macro-scale cultural issues matter in how individuals can be 
expected to perceive risk and react to new technologies. I show that it is likely that 
dimensions of national culture have consequences for CCS development beyond 
the level of local communities immediately affected by projects. Finally, I study 
the risk perceptions of experts from different key stakeholders to demonstrate who 
is concerned with what and why with respect to CCS and how those concerns differ 
in various countries (Article IV).  This part of the research is based on analysis of 
data collected from case studies of three countries with different socio-technical 
and policy settings concerning CCS (Article IV): Germany, Norway and Finland. I 
focused on several flagship projects in these countries. My co-author and I discuss 
details of the case studies in Article IV. 
     The following boxes are brief abstracts from the four articles that contributed to 
addressing the research questions and fulfilling the objectives of this dissertation: 
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 Karimi, F., Goulas, A., Barzmehri, M. M., & Anggana Putri, M. (2012). 
CCS potential in Norway -Exploring the role of flagship projects: The 
Mongstad and Kårstø case studies. International Journal of 
Sustainable Water and Environmental Systems 4, 23-34. 
CCS is deemed to be a necessary bridging technology for a low-carbon 
economy, but the technology needs to pass considerable hurdles before 
widespread use. In this article, we show the socio-technical 
development of CCS using the case study of two flagship projects in 
Norway. We discuss how these projects in such a progressive country 
ended in deadlock and demonstrate why CCS is a controversial 
technology. We also explore the landscape influences and the regime 
dynamics of the technology. In addition, we propose a taxonomy of 
stakeholders in the CCS field. Finally, we identify some barriers to 
CCS development including ‘over-optimism’, under-estimation of 
mitigation costs, social acceptance and change in the major actor’s 
priorities for investments.  We suggest taking some measures to address 
the identified barriers such as a further study on the social acceptability 
of CCS, increase in R&D funding and robust policies about CO2 
taxation. 
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       Karimi, F., Toikka, A., & Hukkinen, J. I. (2016). Comparative Socio-
Cultural Analysis of Risk Perception of Carbon Capture and Storage in 
the European Union. Energy Research & Social Science 21:114-122 
The reaction of the public to CCS will considerably affect the 
development of the technology. The importance of cultural issues in 
CCS deployment has been acknowledged, but research on the large-
scale cultural patterns is lacking. To fill this knowledge gap, we 
combine aggregated individual-level measurements of technology 
opinions with indicators that characterise national cultures. We use 
survey data together with cross-cultural data to show that nation-specific 
cultural issues can be used as a macro-level approximation of public 
reactions to CCS technology. Public reactions incorporate cultural 
factors, such as the degree of separation between groups, the strength of 
institutions over space, time and social roles and society’s tolerance for 
uncertainty and ambiguity. Furthermore, we develop two indices to 
understand why and how societies and societal actors challenge and 
contest technologies and energy regimes. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Karimi, F., & Toikka, A. (Under review). General Public Reactions to 
CCS: does culture matter? International Journal of Greenhouse Gas 
Control 
      Previous research has identified general and local mechanisms in how 
the general public reacts to CCS technology. While differences between 
countries had been observed, the effects of cross-cultural differences 
have not been explored in detail. We argue that it is crucial to 
understand how public perception of the technology emerges and forms 
in their contexts or is embedded in the large-scale cultural frameworks. 
We structure public reaction to CCS in two dimensions (Risk Perception 
and Benefit Perception) and design a model with individual and national 
culture-level predictors. We indicate that the effects of individual-level 
variables, such as familiarity with technology or socio-demographic 
variables (such as education) are important, but their effects are 
mediated and confounded by the large-scale cultural setting people 
operate in. The results show that risk perception is mainly affected by 
cultural dimensions (such as uncertainty avoidance) and the society’s 
short-term or long-term orientation. We provide a framework for 
policymakers to understand why and how societies challenge and 
contest CCS.   
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   Karimi, F., & Komendantova, N. (2017). Understanding experts’ views 
and risk perceptions on carbon capture and storage in three European 
countries. GeoJournal 82:185-200  
            In this article, we investigate experts’ views and risk perception.   
Understanding them will contribute to the risk governance of CCS by 
demonstrating who is concerned about what and why with respect to 
CCS, and how risk perception and stakeholders’ concerns vary in 
different countries. Our analysis shows that in countries where 
opposition to CCS is the strongest (Germany), risk perception can be 
driven by factors such as lack of trust and doubts about the need of the 
projects. At the same time, in countries with moderate or very low- 
opposition levels (Norway or Finland), risk perception is more 
connected with the risk of investment. We also conclude that the 
strongest polarisation in risk perception is among NGOs in different 
countries, followed by scientists. Finally, we discuss that such large 
variation in risk perception of experts could be influenced by several 
factors, including cultural orientation and the social, political and 
technical settings for deployment of technology in each country. 
A
rti
cl
e 
IV
 
2 ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK  
Risk is the possibility of harm or damage. In other words, risk characterises the 
impact and the likelihood of something undesirable that may happen as a 
consequence of an action (Asselt and Renn 2011; Cambridge Dictionary 2017; 
Asselt et al. 2012). Risk perception is an intuitive or subjective judgment that 
people make about the characteristic(s), severity and impact(s) of risk (Slovic 2000, 
Darker 2013). Two broad approaches can be distinguished in the study of culture 
and consequently risk perception, namely anthropological and sociological 
approaches. In this dissertation, I adopt the latter (Article II). Figure 3 depicts the 
hypothesised model of the interrelation between national culture and risk 
perception of sustainable energy systems. While the rectangle shows the primary 
scope of my dissertation, I touch upon the impact of national culture on other 
factors and ultimately upon social acceptability (Articles II and III). I define social 
acceptability as the combination of social acceptance and social support. In my 
understanding, social acceptability is a more democratic and socially inclusive 
concept than social acceptance, which is a top-down concept and mainly evaluates 
whether stakeholders and laypeople are not actively opposing or contesting a 
technology (Batel et al. 2013). Furthermore, despite much literature using the terms 
social acceptance and social support interchangeably (e.g.,Yang et al. 2016; Itaoka 
et al. 2009; Huijts et al. 2007), I have sympathy with Batel et al. (2013) in that we 
should exercise caution in the social study of energy systems and thus distinguish 
between these two terms.  
     The focus of the research is on two main stakeholders (Article I): laypeople and 
experts. I understand experts as stakeholders with sufficient knowledge about CCS 
based on their direct or indirect involvement with CCS projects. By contrast, 
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laypeople are stakeholders whose level of awareness and knowledge about CCS 
projects might be minimal or general (Articles I and IV). 
 
Figure 3. Influence of national culture on risk perception and social acceptability of CCS 
 
2.1 RISK PERCEPTION: AN OVERVIEW 
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My co-authors and I conducted a literature review of risk perception in Articles II,
III and IV. I consider CCS technology to be an example of what Renn (2008) de-
fines as the new generation risk: systemic with epistemic uncertainties. The risk is 
systemic due to the risk to the environment and human health has complicated and 
obscure consequences. The risk includes epistemic uncertainties because a lack 
of knowledge exists on the cardinal mechanisms underlying the general CCS im-
pacts and consequences. The new generation risk challenges even environmental
risk assessment that is not solvable only by means of evidence-based reasoning. 
Thus, the first step in risk analysis is to understand and decide which risks are 
more important and which are less important or can even be ignored.
32
 In this dissertation, my focus is largely on the socio-cultural risk theory and the
social construction of risk. Some major studies show the importance of cultural
values in the risk perception and understanding of technology, mainly based on the
Cultural Theory (CT) of Mary Douglas (e.g., Kahan 2009; Slovic 2000; Dake 
1992; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Stallings 1990; Johnson and Covello 1987; 
Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Thompson and Wildavsky 1982).
 Douglas and Wildavsky (1983) pose an essential question, ‘why do people
emphasise some risk while ignoring others?’ They argue that when it comes to risk,
each society has its very own understanding that decides what is of concern, what
should be given higher priority and how to deal with the risk. Thus, societies are
selective concerning risk. Johnson and Covello (1987) elaborate Douglas and
Wildavsky’s theory and explain that it is not nature that influences societies to
choose and understand what is risky, rather it is predominately social and cultural
factors that influence their determination of risk. Dake (1992) argues that risk
preferences and perceptions and ‘interpretation of natural phenomena’ are social
constructions of culture. Furthermore, Nelkin (1989) asserts that risk is partly a
social construction; risk evaluation is thus a social process. Through a holistic
approach and by using an actual case study, Fitchen et al. (1987) show the
complexity of risk perception and that ‘the local context in which the risk is
embedded’ influences the risk. Brown (1987) gives weight to social and cultural
factors and claims that some factors such as psychological factors are not capable
of explaining risk perception completely because risk perception stems from social
norms.
 However, the aforementioned studies focus on generic cultural features that
have little to do with national characteristics and that relate instead to the degree to
which an individual belongs to a social group and is circumscribed by social rules
in a community. Furthermore, some researchers are sceptical about CT; for
instance, Sjöberg claims that dimensions of Douglasian Cultural Theory are not
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successful in explaining risk perception, suggesting further research for a new and 
altered approach (Sjöberg 1998; 2000).  
     Jasanoff (1987; 2012) describes the role of cultural factors in risk perception 
‘crucial’ and claims that these factors even shape ‘scientific aspects of risk 
assessment’. Through a comparative study between the US and the UK, she 
supports her social constructionist approach to risk and argues that national culture 
influences not only risk perception of the general public but also scientists and 
policymakers (Jasanoff 1987).  
     The significance of my dissertation vis-à-vis the existing literature is the way in 
which I approach culture. I consider national culture to distinguish one nation from 
another. With the exception of one study (i.e., Jasanoff 1987), all of the 
aforementioned studies categorise culture within a nation or community (i.e., 
anthropologists’ perspective). Comparative cross-national and cross-cultural 
studies are also a point of dispute between anthropological schools of thought, on 
one side, and psychological, political and social scientific schools of thought on the 
opposite (Kohn 1987 and Boholm 1998). I elucidate this discussion in Section 2.2. 
     Hsee and Weber have opened a new door to the study of risk perception and risk 
preference from the perspective of cross-cultural and cross-national differences 
mainly in the business and finance fields (Hsee and Weber 2006). Nonetheless, to 
my knowledge the following questions remain valid and unanswered: How to 
operationalise risk perception by utilising cross-cultural differences? What are the 
practical consequences of cross-cultural differences? I develop a framework to 
operationalise risk perception according to national cultural features to understand 
how to deal with risks and uncertainties of a new energy technology that involves 
siting controversy. This operationalisation is based on a cultural contextualisation 
of the risk perception of CCS. Thus, for the framework I first develop two indices 
to study and measure the influence of national culture on risk perception (Article 
II): Risk Perception (RP) and Benefit Perception (BP). RP measures how much 
worry or concern respondents have about the use of CCS. BP measures a perceived 
benefit, whether from a personal perspective or public perspective (i.e., the extent 
to which CCS can serve as a climate change mitigation tool). 
     Finally, other important factors exist that shape risk perceptions (Article II and 
III). I discuss these concisely in the following subsections.  
2.1.1 TRUST  
Trust in government and key stakeholders is a crucial factor in risk perception and 
acceptability of technology (e.g.,Earle and Siegrist, 2008; Midden and Huijts 2009; 
Terwel et al. 2009a; Terwel et al. 2009b; Terwel 2009; Terwel et al. 2011; Upham 
and Roberts 2011; Brulle et al. 2012; Terwel and Daamen 2012; Wallquist et al., 
2012a; Seigo et al. 2014a; Yang et al. 2016). For instance, trust in NGOs and 
research institutes are the highest, and consequently people rely on what they 
advocate or verify and would prefer to engage with them in decision making 
processes more than industrial stakeholders (Eurobarometer 2011; Terwel et al. 
2011).   
     Terwel et al. (2009a; 2009b) show that higher trust in stakeholders leads to 
lower risk perception. However, Terwel et al. (2009a) distinguish between two 
types of trust in the acceptance of CCS: competence-based trust and integrity-based 
trust. The former concerns trust that is founded in the expertise of stakeholders. 
The latter refers to trust constructed on the honesty and good reputation of 
stakeholders. They conclude that people have relatively positive opinions about 
CCS if competence-based trust in stakeholders who support CCS is high. On the 
contrary, people’s negative opinions increase when integrity-based trust in 
proponents of CCS is low. 
     Yang et al. (2016) claim that public trust influences public cognition, perceived 
risk and benefit and environmental awareness; these are the four factors that affect 
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acceptability of the technology. Huijts et al. (2007) measure perceived risks and 
benefits, attitudes, emotions and trust in actors to form a big picture of acceptance. 
Moreover, Upham and Roberts (2011) state that, in the context of CCS governance, 
risk attributable to the public’s lack of trust in stakeholders is very likely to 
challenge CCS deployment. 
     Despite the majority of literature confirming the immediate role of trust, 
Wallquist et al. (2012a) present a model to show how convictions and trust 
influence people’s reactions to CCS in a causal way, and conclude that while 
convictions regarding issues such as emission reduction influence risk and benefit 
perceptions, trust is not directly influential. Nonetheless, they mention that if the 
public could understand and distinguish the role of each stakeholder in the future, 
trust will become an influential factor.  
2.1.2 COMMUNICATION  
Knowledge and information are usually influential factors on risk perception of the 
technology (e.g., Curry et al. 2004; Shackley et al. 2005; Tokushige et al. 2007; 
Sharp et al. 2009; de Best-Waldhober et al. 2009; Itaoka et al. 2009, Wallquist et 
al., 2010;Gough et al. 2014; Dowd et al. 2014; Schumann 2015). Researchers have 
tried to estimate the effect of providing information on the public reactions with 
social experiments and questionnaires. Results have varied both in magnitude and 
direction, with positive, negative and non-significant results depending on the 
procedure (de Best-Waldhober et al. 2009; Shackley et al. 2005; Sharp et al. 2009; 
Curry et al. 2004). Generally, the level of knowledge on CCS among the public is 
very low (e.g., Wallquist et al., 2010; Upham and Roberts 2011; Eurobarometer 
2011; Yang et al. 2016). De Best-Waldhober et al. (2009) claim that uninformed 
laypeople have volatile opinions. Their results show that after providing the public 
with enough supportive information from experts, people reluctantly accept the 
deployment of CCS.   
      Methods of outreach and communication, the processes of dissemination, and 
content of communication have different degrees of influence on risk perception 
(e.g., ter Mors et al. 2010; Wallquist et al. 2010; Ashworth et al., 2010; Brunsting 
et al. 2011; Dütschke 2011; Brunsting et al. 2013; Bruine de Bruin and Wong-
Parodi 2014; Ashworth et al. 2015; Bruin et al., 2015). For instance, Wallquist et 
al. (2010) show that the knowledge level on CO2 is also very limited among 
laypeople; if communication and engineering experts inform the public about the 
properties and effect of CO2, concern regarding leakage might decrease. Bruin et 
al. (2015) suggest three measures for effective CCS communications: informing 
about alternative technologies to CCS, using plain and simple wording for 
informing about the technology and timely communication about the technology. 
However, they emphasise that ‘creating simple communications is no easy feat’ 
(Bruin et al. 2015). Furthermore, Ashworth et al. (2010) provide comprehensive 
recommendations about the content and processes of communication about CCS. 
Among others, they recommend the engagement of NGOs in preparation of 
materials and communication about CCS and developing a range of mediums for 
communication. The content of these communications should address people’s 
concerns about the risk of the technology and the role and share of renewable 
energy in the wider portfolio of climate change mitigation (Ashworth et al. 2010).  
      Finally, some studies posit that increasing knowledge and information will not 
lead to reduced risk aversion of new and emerging technologies because 
respondents’ reactions always incorporate factors beyond just technical properties 
(Dunlap 1998; Bulkeley 2000; Satterfield et al. 2009, Kahan 2009; Brunsting et al., 
2013). Furthermore, Upham and Roberts (2011) show that after the public received 
information about the technology, people’s uncertainty about the technology 
changed to negative opinion. However, Wallquist et al. (2010) claim that lack of 
knowledge leads to more positive perceptions of risk and benefit in some cases, but 
to more negative perceptions in other cases.   
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2.1.3 COMMUNITY CHARACTERISTICS  
One strand of research that tries to measure the risk perception of CCS has focused 
on the localities of the proposed facilities (For instances: Tokushige et al. 2007; 
Pietzner et al. 2011). Moreover, the Not In My Backyard (NIMBY) or Not Under 
My Backyard (NUMBY) concepts are considered as possible factors that shape a 
local community’s risk perception and social acceptance concerning CCS (e.g., 
Braun 2017; Krause et al. 2014; Terwel et al. 2013; Wallquist et al. 2012; Haug and 
Stigson 2016; ter Mors et al. 2012; Terwel and Daamen 2012; Groothuis et al. 
2008; Schively 2007). Furthermore, proximity, local residents’ economic losses or 
decreases in real estate value and community compensation were discussed as 
factors influencing risk perception and social acceptance of CCS (e.g., Haug and 
Stigson 2016; ter Mors and Groeneweg 2016; Terwel and ter Mors 2015; Krause et 
al. 2014; Terwel et al. 2014; Zaal et al. 2014; ter Mors et al. 2014; ter Mors et al. 
2012; Terwel et al. 2012; Warren et al. 2014; Kuijper 2011; Groothuis et al. 2008; 
Schively 2007). According to Krause et al. (2014), NIMBY reactions (general 
support for CCS adoption but opposition to local projects) are attributable to 
individual values, economic benefit of community and concern about the safety of 
CCS. They hypothesised that owning a dwelling influences CCS risk perception 
whereas it has less impact on the national acceptance level of CCS.  
      A few studies investigate the role of NIMBYism, or concerns about proximity 
or real estate (or all of them) in specific case studies featuring the Netherlands 
(mainly focusing on the case of Barendrecht) (Huijts et al., 2007; Terwel et al. 
2012; Brunsting et al. 2011; Kuijper 2011) and Germany (Braun, 2017). For 
example, Terwel et al. (2012) surveyed 811 residents of Barendrecht and report that 
people concerned about the possibility that the CCS project ‘would cause a fall in 
local property value’.  Braun (2017) claimed that ‘living in or next to a county with 
a potential CCS site significantly reduces the acceptance of CCS’, confirming 
NIMBY reactions to CCS. 
     Terwal and Daamen (2012), however, assert that ‘the psychological structure of 
attitudes towards CCS’ is fairly similar for onsite and offsite people in the same 
country. Huijts et al. (2007) discuss that local negative views about CCS are not 
necessarily attributable to NIMBYism or NUMBYism. Burningham (2000) shows 
through a case study on the construction of a new road that the NIMBY concept 
does not fully capture the complex issue of local concerns because such concerns 
are not purely due to self-interest. Moreover, Wolsink (2006) and Burningham 
(2000) claim that the NIMBY concept is used to ‘tarnish’ those who have opposing 
views to a siting-related development. Wolsink (2006; 2007) calls for the 
abandonment of the NIMBY concept as he perceives it as a pejorative, selfish and 
false argument about those who think differently, which may even lead to 
xenophobic sentiment in some cases. 
      Finally, some researchers have gone beyond NIMBYism and attachment to 
place in studies about the effects of community characteristics on risk perception 
(e.g., Devine-Wright 2009; Bradbury et al. 2009; Dowd et al. 2014; Bradbury 
2012; Anderson et al. 2012; Ashworth et al., 2012). For instance, Bradbury et al. 
(2009) and Bradbury (2012) identify difference in socioeconomic and cultural 
characteristics of a community as a factor that affect public perception of CCS. 
Anderson et al. (2012) show how human and social capital characteristics, as well 
as experience of similar facilities, such as gas pipelines, influence acceptance of 
CCS within local communities.  
2.1.4 EXPERTS’ VIEWS AND RISK PERCEPTIONS ON CCS  
A limited number of studies investigate the perceptions of experts on CCS. Gough 
(2008) and Evar (2011) studied experts’ opinions on the risks and challenges of 
CCS deployment in the UK. Similar studies exist on the risks and barriers for CCS 
development and deployment in Spain (Sala and Oltra 2011), China (Dapeng and 
Weiwei 2009), the USA (Davies et al. 2013) and Vietnam (Nguyen-Trinh and Ha-
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Duong 2015). Other work has included expert perceptions of CCS on the global 
scale (Hansson and Bryngelsson 2009; Johnsson et al. 2010) and other 
supranational scales such as the EU (Shackley et al. 2007; Shackley et al., 2009). In 
these studies, the major risks of deployment, as well as the barriers to it, were 
identified based on experts’ personal views in the EU, North America and Japan. 
However, these studies did not explicitly focus on experts, as they were part of a 
large-scale survey (Shackley et al. 2007). In short, in Article IV we argue that 
despite research on risk perception of CCS, updated studies regarding the 
differences between various groups of experts within and between the countries are 
lacking. Similar to Shackley et al. 2009, we present experts’ recent perceptions of 
CCS in some EU countries.  
      In sum, the factors discussed in this section (e.g., trust and communication) are 
all important factors that affect risk perception. However, I argue that national 
culture is as important; it is a macro-level societal factor affecting risk perception.  
Moreover, cross-cultural factors help us capture the relationship between 
laypeople’s and experts’ stances towards the technology. In the following section 
and chapters 4 and 5, I discuss how culture enables the full understanding of the 
phenomena in detail. 
 
 
 
 
 
2.2. CULTURE  
            Culture: the cry of men in face of their destiny2. 
         -Albert Camus 
What exactly culture is and how it is constructed are two fundamental questions 
that are not trivial to address. Culture is an abstract construct. Moreover, 
approaches to study and specify culture are varied between and within academic 
fields. Thus, a sole, straightforward, correct answer does not exist for these 
questions. Nonetheless, Thompson et al. (1990) and Minkov (2013) suggest that 
what a researcher needs to do when it comes to the concept of culture is to present 
explicitly a clear definition of what it is and how they conceptualise and measure 
culture. In addition, a researcher should clarify operationalisation of the cultural 
approach that they adopt. While anthropologists have been working systematically 
on theorising culture for nearly a century (e.g., Benedict 1934; Kluckhohn 1951; 
Kroeber and Parsons 1958; White, 1959; Geertz 1973; Douglas 1987), most other 
fields only realised the concept of culture a couple of decades later (e.g., Berry 
1969; Hofstede 1980; Child 1981; Jahoda 1984; Poortinga and Van De Vijver, 
1987).  
     One of the popular definitions of culture is, ‘culture consists in patterned ways 
of thinking, feeling and reacting, acquired and transmitted mainly by symbols, 
constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, including their 
embodiments in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of tradition (i.e., 
historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values’ 
(Kluckhohn 1951, p. 86).  Similarly, my understanding of culture is ‘the collective 
programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category 
of people from another’ (Hofstede 2001, p. 9). Culture has visible and invisible 
                                                          
2 Albert Camus. (n.d.). AZQuotes.com. Retrieved June 05, 2017, from AZQuotes.com Web site: 
http://www.azquotes.com/quote/46652 
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aspects (Minkov 2013). The invisible side of a culture is in our mind, such as 
values (Hofstede 2001). The visible part of a culture is manifested in human 
behaviour and interactions in a society. Furthermore, elements of culture are values 
(Kluckhohn 1951; Hofstede 2001), norms (Smith et al. 1996), beliefs (Bond et al. 
2004), attitudes (Benedict 1934) and symbols (Almond and Verba, 1963; Hofstede 
2001). Values are conceptions of desirables that influence actions and are 
attributable to a characteristic of a group (Kluckhohn 1951). Norms are values that 
people desire to see in other’s behaviour (Minkov 2013). Beliefs are ‘social 
axioms’ about physical or spiritual worlds and ‘about the relationship between two 
entities or concepts’ (Bond et al. 2004).  Attitudes are the evaluations of people 
about something (Thompson et al. 1990). I define symbols as all complex features 
that derive from and are influenced by language in one way or another. 
 
 
Figure 4. Elements of culture. 
Note: No order exists for the factors in the background of the figure (i.e., history, etc.). These are 
the factors that influence all elements of culture one way or another. 
 
     To generalise broadly, two groups of cultural studies exist. One group is made 
of conceptual and qualitative studies, such as the Cultural Theory of Douglas, 
which are mainly theoretical and applicable within a country or community 
(Appendix 1). In contrast to these conceptual and qualitative studies of culture, the 
other group consists of quantitative studies that aim to dimensionalise culture to 
measure cross-cultural differences between countries (Appendix 2). In these 
studies, surveys measure the values of society. In other words, questionnaires ask 
the opinions of people, and their results translate to numbers that represent the 
dimensions of a nation’s culture. The results of these large-scale quantitative 
studies are thus a series of country scores. Two approaches have been employed to 
carry out this sort of research. Some studies developed their framework 
empirically. For instance, Hofstede developed his theory based on IBM employees’ 
survey data (Hofstede 2001). Some studies first develop their frameworks 
theoretically, such as Schwartz’s cultural dimensions (Maleki and de Jong 2014), 
and then examine them empirically in large-scale samples from different countries.  
      In short, the difference between the two types of theories (Appendices 1 and 2) 
is that in one group (Appendix 1) cultural dimensions are hypothesised 
conceptually and qualitatively while in the other group (Appendix 2) dimensions 
are developed based on ‘systematic’ and quantitative (survey) analysis for different 
countries. Nevertheless, Maleki and de Jong (2014) grouped cultural dimensions of 
major cultural theories (Appendices1 and 2) and propose nine clusters of 
dimensions built upon both existing conceptual and quantitative cultural 
dimensions to demonstrate that ‘a similar cultural construct can be extracted from 
two distinct cross-cultural studies’ (ibid, p.132). However, qualitative researchers 
and anthropologists have criticised and questioned quantitative cultural dimensions. 
Therefore, Maleki and de Jong’s (2014) approach is a step towards addressing the 
anthropologist’s concerns about the so-called fallacy of quantification of culture 
that I discuss in Section 2.2.1. The clusters are (Maleki and de Jong 2014): 
Individualism vs. Collectivism, Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, Mastery 
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vs. Harmony, Traditionalism vs. Secularism, Indulgence vs. Restraint, 
Assertiveness vs. Tenderness, Gender Egalitarianism and Collaborativeness. 
     I draw a distinction between cultural values and situational attitudes. A common 
misperception of cultural values, cultural products (i.e., cultural implications) and 
situational attitudes exists. In principle, the rate of change in cultural values is 
steady and does not happen over years or decades (Maleki and Hendriks 2015; 
Beugelsdijk et al. 2015). In contrast, situational attitudes are dynamic traits that are 
fluctuating even in the short term. Hence, I adopt the position that the 
operationalisation of some cultural dimensions such as the Group and Grid of 
Cultural Theory (cf. Grendstad 1999; Melton 2003) suffer from a lack of 
distinction between cultural values and situational attitudes (Maleki 2015; Maleki 
and Hendriks 2015). Furthermore, ‘objective culture’ should not be mixed with the 
concept of culture that I use in this research.  Objective culture is what we see as, 
for instance, artefacts and objects and institutions such as laws (Triandis 1972; 
Hofstede 2001; Minkov 2013).   
     Research on the perception and acceptability of technologies and people’s 
adaptation to them in different countries needs to account for the different natural 
and technical settings as well as how differences in where people live frame their 
worldviews and form their opinions. Multiple theories exist on how cultures differ 
and how to operationalise these differences into quantitative measurements. 
However, some of the theories are less explanatory for highlighting differences 
across cultures, although they do capture some important cultural factors. Since 
those theories lack adequate dimensions, they fail to distinguish between some of 
the nuances of cultural features. For instance, the well-known two-dimensional 
cultural theory of Inglehart (which distinguishes between Traditional versus 
Secular-rational and Survival versus Self-Expression) or the conceptual and 
qualitative Cultural Theory of Mary Douglas (which distinguishes between 
dimensions of Group and Grid) fall into the categories of inadequate-dimensional 
theories. Minkov (2013) points out that more dimensions can be extracted from 
each of Inglehart’s two dimensions. The low resolution of two-dimensional 
schemes has important implications for analysis. For example, what is 
amalgamated into Traditional versus Secular-rational could plausibly incorporate 
authority relationships, values and views on uncertainty, while these may affect 
technology-society relationships independently (ibid). Nonetheless, any model of 
national culture is necessarily a compromise between representativeness and 
usefulness.  
     In article II, I argue that Hofstede’s six-dimensional model is a good 
compromise in that the measured concepts match well with what would be 
expected to be important, specifically in the context of technology. Hofstede’s 
dimensions are designed to highlight differences between national cultures and 
include varieties of cultural characteristics. The dimensions accentuate the culture 
of each society. Thus, it can potentially contribute to explain reasonable variances 
across countries that so-called big-dimensions of some cultural theories might not 
explain. Moreover, some of Hofstede’s dimensions are apt for the study of issues 
related to risk perception and contingencies. For example, Uncertainty Avoidance, 
defined as the extent to which individuals feel uncomfortable about unknown, 
uncertain and unclear situations or occasions (Hofstede et al. 2010), or Masculinity 
vs. Femininity (MAS)3 are dimensions that are directly relevant to the study of risk 
perception and understanding of technologies related to climate change. Despite the 
fact that I used Hofstede’s dimensions to operationalise risk perceptions, which 
appears to have worked well in my study, alternative cross-cultural studies might 
also have been used. 
     Quantification and operationalisation of culture, especially national culture, are 
very controversial subjects. The dimensionalisation of culture in the work of 
                                                          
3 Despite its prima facie impression, this dimension should not be misconstrued as a dimension pertinent to 
gender-related characteristics.  
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Hofstede and Minkov, among others, is criticised mainly from the anthropological 
point of view, which argues that it is not possible, or at least not accurate, to 
quantify the shared beliefs, attitudes and values of a society based on surveys and 
statistical data, (Heine et al. 2002; Williamson 2002; Peng et al. 1997). Translation 
error, cultural differences in response style and representativeness of survey sample 
are claimed as the shortcomings of cross-cultural dimensions, along with 
stereotyping (Heine et al. 2002; Peng et al. 1997). In addition, Hofstede’s 
methodology in defining some dimensions, such as Individualism vs. Collectivism, 
is criticised by some researchers (Takano and Osaka 1999; Heine et al. 2002). 
However, Minkov (2013) presented several studies by other researchers showing 
that the dimension of Individualism vs. Collectivism has been extracted from 
various samples, including students (Chinese Cultural Connections 1987), 
company employees (Smith et al. 1996), teachers (Schwartz 1994) and nationally 
representative samples (Welzel 2010). Moreover, Hofstede and Minkov have 
responded to the other criticisms (Hofstede 2010; 2009; 2003; 2002; 2002a; 2001; 
Hofstede et al. 2010; Minkov 2013). In Article II I briefly discuss some of these 
criticisms as well as Hofstede and Minkov’s responses. I summarise their responses 
in the following. 
      Many anthropologists are inclined to ignore the ‘dimensions paradigm’4 
(Hofstede 2001; 2002; 2003; 2009; Minkov 2013). One of the major objectives of 
dimensionalisation of national culture is to highlight and distinguish similarities 
and differences between countries (Minkov 2013). ‘Dimensions of culture reduce 
the enormous record of observed cultural differences in the world to a small 
number of imaginary variables that help us make sense of the seemingly 
unfathomable complexity across the globe’ (ibid, p128). Nevertheless, dimensions 
do not exist except inside nations’ minds (Hofstede 2002; Minkov 2013). In other 
                                                          
4 Kuppens et al. (2006) and Minkov (2013) categorised two approaches to study of emotions, values and 
culture: the discrete approach and dimensional. The latter is widely known as the ‘dimensions paradigm’ in 
cultural literature. 
words, ‘they are constructs, which have to prove their usefulness by their ability to 
explain and predict behavior’ (Hofstede 2002). Furthermore, Hofstede did not 
assume data from IBM surveys were representative of each society although they 
are ‘well-matched’ samples of a large number of countries (Hofstede 2001). In 
other words, he used the data as matching samples in a way that characterised the 
samples by matched settings (i.e., many factors are equal for the respondents of the 
surveys, except their nationality). This enabled Hofstede to control for such factors 
and thus measure the differences between the values of the population (Hofstede 
2001; Minkov 2013).  
     Hofstede demonstrated that completely different sources validated the 
dimensions. These included not just various surveys but also non-survey qualitative 
data such as McClelland’s (1961) data from a content analysis of children books 
(Hofstede 2001). Indeed, he emphasises that surveys should not be the sole 
measure for cultural differences (ibid). In this regard, ample studies exist that 
validate and replicate the dimensions through other sources (Barkema and 
Vermeulen 1997; De Mooij 2000; Hofstede 2001; 2002; Hofstede et al. 2010). In 
addition, Hofstede acknowledges that the scores of national culture are not 
stereotyping individuals of the nations because the range of characters and 
behaviours within a country is far too wide for stereotyping: ‘national cultures 
scores are not about individuals, but about national societies’ (Hofstede et al. 2010, 
p40). In other words, the scores represent the ‘dominant national culture traits’ of 
the countries (Hofstede 2001). Minkov lends support to this argument and states 
that the dimensions do not describe individuals of countries but they describe 
‘national societies’ (Minkov 2013). 
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3 METHODOLOGY  
   3.1 OVERVIEW OF RESEARCH METHODS  
This is a comparative study in two aspects: between countries and between 
laypeople and experts. Moreover, the unit of analysis in this dissertation is country-
level. I used mixed methods to address the research questions of the dissertation. In 
the quantitative part of the study, we mainly employed survey data analysis (Article 
II) and statistical modelling (Article III) to operationalise risk perception of CCS 
among laypeople.  
     We used a multilevel linear regression method to estimate the effects of 
individual and group-level predictors. The goal of the model was to extend the 
basic linear regression model to account for variables measured at different levels, 
the levels here being the individual and the country. A regular linear regression 
would ignore the fact that the country-level variables do not vary within a country, 
and thus underestimate the standard error of the estimates.  
      In our regression analysis, we used 11 independent variables and two 
dependent variables. We derived five individual-level independent variables from 
the Eurobarometer survey. Since we had to rely on secondary data, the selection of 
countries was fixed. However, we believe that the countries represent a reasonable 
mix of cultures, as all five European country clusters from a meta-analysis of 
cultural typologies are represented (Ronen and Shenkar 1985). The measures 
include education, age, knowledge of CCS, knowledge of CO2 and knowledge of 
climate change. The second-level or country-level independent variables are 
Hofstede’s cross-cultural dimensions. Each country has a score for each cultural 
dimension. The dependent variables are the Risk Perception (RP) and Benefit 
Perception (BP) indices. To develop these two, we chose some CCS questions that 
represent reactions to the technology in general or in a local context and performed 
a principal component analysis (PCA) on the responses. We chose the questions on 
the basis that they measure only dispositions towards CCS and not whether the 
current national government is trustworthy, for example. The questions were split 
into two components, one with questions on the benefits of CCS, the other on risk 
issues. We used IBM SPSS and the lme4 package of R for multi-level or mixed-
effects modelling (Bates et al. 2015).  
     For the qualitative part, we used discourse analysis (Article IV), analysis of 
Function of Innovations Systems (FIS) and regime and landscape analysis (Article 
I) with a thorough literature survey concerning development of the technology, risk 
perception as well as cultural studies and social sciences of CCS (Articles I, II, III, 
IV).  
      Understanding and interpretation of the major and radical changes that 
accompany a systemic socio-technical transition of an Innovation System (IS) is a 
complex analytical process. Through this procedure, important information for the 
successful implementation of an emerging technology can be provided. 
      A ‘regime’ is a certain set of practices, rules and shared assumptions that 
dominate the interaction of the system and the various actors involved (Rotmans et 
al. 2001). The regime sphere is a rather stable structure that engulfs the dominant 
technological aspects, representing the ‘normal’ or ‘business as usual’ approach of 
an operation. The regime is regarded as the meso-level of evolution in the multi-
level perspective in transition analysis studies (Article I). The projection of the 
regime’s sphere into the macro-level often marks the appearance of the landscape 
region. This sphere is taking over a much larger context and thus it moves at a 
much slower evolution pace (Van Eijck and Romijn 2008). Established 
technologies can serve as an interconnecting link between the regime and 
landscape regions. Changes of a landscape usually require a sustained effort over a 
lengthy period of time. Niches are starting points on the technological plane, from 
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where innovation can diffuse into the regime-landscape spheres, resulting in a 
transition effect either on the regime level or more rarely on the landscape level 
(Article I). 
      FIS is a procedure that represents necessities and vital activities for the 
development of technology, and identifies key policy issues based on seven core 
functions (Article I). Hekkert and Negro (2009) have empirically tested and studied 
functions of innovation systems to verify the analytical validity of these functions 
and to present a better understanding of the different components of an innovative 
technology such as structure, dynamics and performance of the technology. The 
seven functions and some of the issues they address are (Hekkert et al. 2007):  
1. Entrepreneurial activity: the number and the degree of variety in 
entrepreneurial experiments and how widely the technologies are used. 
2. Knowledge creation: the number of different R&D projects and type of 
knowledge created and their creators. 
3. Knowledge diffusion: the extent and type of (inter)national collaboration 
between actors in an innovation system. 
4. Guidance: the amount and type of visions and expectations about a 
technology, and the specific targets or regulations set by the government or 
industry. 
5. Market creation: the phase of the specific market and customers and end-
users of the technology. 
6. Resource mobilisation: the availability of human capital (through education, 
entrepreneurship or management) and financial capital. 
7. Legitimisation: the public opinion about a technology, its portrayal in the 
media and the main arguments of actors for or against the technology’s 
deployment. 
 
      The theoretical framework we used to understand differences in risk 
perceptions among groups of experts is grounded in discourse analysis. According 
to Royrvik et al. (2012), discourses form and change ‘our perception of reality, 
based on particular ways to speak about and understand the world’. Foucault 
describes discourses as ‘ways of constituting knowledge, together with the social 
practices, forms of subjectivity and power relations, which inhere in such 
knowledges and relations between them’ (Weedon 1987, p. 108; Foucault 1995). 
Moreover, the aim of discourse analysis is to understand how a topic is depicted 
(Royrvik et al. 2012).  Hajer & Versteeg (2006), highlight the important role of 
discourse analysis in environmental policy research, asserting: ‘The study of 
discourse also allows one to see how a diversity of actors actively try to influence 
the definition of the problem.’ They believe that discourse analysis has the capacity 
to address the ‘how’ questions. In my case, I used it to address the key question of 
how experts’ risk perceptions differ. 
      My co-author and I used Cultural Theory-based discourse analysis in Article 
IV. Steven Ney (2009; 2014) developed this method for analysing the policy 
making of a ‘wicked problem’ and social innovation. The method is grounded in 
two prominent theories: Narrative Policy Framework (NPF)5 and CT (Ney 2014). 
The method explores how actors under influence of ‘macro-level policy belief-
systems’ produce policy narratives by systematically scrutinising the structure of 
policy narratives through NPF and the content of policy narratives through CT 
(Ney 2014). Inspired by CT, Ney (2014) claims that policy narratives are the 
construct of ‘perceptual lenses’ of policy actors in which macro-level cultural 
                                                          
5 NPF is a framework for the empirical study of policy narratives by defining narrative structure and content. 
According to this framework, narratives are socially constructed and influence individual attitudes and 
consequently public opinion (Jones and McBeth, 2010; Jones et al. 2014).  While the theories of public policy 
appraise impacts of policy actors on the policy process, they largely fail to scrutinise the role of policy 
narratives. Thus, the NPF fills this notable gap by explicitly scrutinising the policy narratives that influence the 
policy process (Pierce et al. 2014). In other words, most of the other scholarship are ‘interpretative’ such that 
they are heavily descriptive and lack clarity due to rejection of scientific standards of hypothesis testing (Jones 
et al. 2014). Thus, they are neither replicable nor credible for generalising (ibid). Jones et al. (2014) claim that 
‘NFP is an attempt to apply objective methodological approaches (i.e., science) to subjective social reality (i.e., 
policy narratives)’ (ibid, p. 3). 
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factors influence those perceptions. He believes that ‘shared ideas, values and 
beliefs’ impact the perception and opinion of actors (i.e., individuals with diverse 
institutional and professional backgrounds) (Ney 2009). In other words, actors 
select and emphasise the different aspects of a problem or issue according to their 
cultural orientation (ibid). 
      According to this method and inspired by CT, each story (narratives) ‘creates a 
setting’ (the basic assumptions), ‘points to villains’ (the problems and who or what 
is causing them) and ‘declares its heroes’ (the possible solutions and who or what 
should be responsible) (Ney 2009). In this method, narratives (i.e., arguments) and 
perceptions of actors are compared with each other. By comparing assumptions of 
these narratives and comparing how they define the problem and the solutions, 
researchers are able to understand different views of stakeholders, to map areas of 
policy agreement and disagreement and to generate solutions to policy problems 
(Jones 2010, Ney 2012). 
    3.2 DATA AND CASE STUDIES  
I investigated case studies from CCS development in EU countries. I used 
quantitative and qualitative data from different sources (Table 1). Furthermore, I 
deployed several different empirical methods. The quantitative part of the research 
is based on the Eurobarometer survey data and the scores of cross-cultural 
dimensions for the countries. The Eurobarometer survey was conducted to 
understand awareness and acceptance levels of CCS (2011). It asked respondents to 
rate their knowledge of climate change and CCS and their views on CCS. The 
survey was conducted as part of the Eurobarometer survey programme in 2011 and 
included 13,901 respondents spread over 12 European countries where CCS 
projects were started or planned (Figure 5). The sampling followed a multi-stage 
and random method. For each country, ‘a number of sampling points was drawn 
with probability proportional to population size (for a total coverage of the country) 
and to population density’ (Eurobarometer 2011).  Therefore, the sample represents 
the whole territory of the countries surveyed according to ‘the distribution of the 
resident population of the respective nationalities in terms of metropolitan, urban 
and rural areas’ (ibid). A starting address, further addresses and a respondent from 
each household were drawn randomly in each of selected points. Interviews were 
conducted face-to-face and in the national languages. For each country, a 
comparison between the sample and the universe description (derived from 
Eurostat population data or national statistics offices) was performed. In addition, 
gender, age, region and size of the locality were introduced in the iteration 
procedure (Eurobarometer 2011). 
      The qualitative part of this research is based on 19 semi-structured expert 
interviews that I conducted with my colleagues in Germany, Norway and Finland. 
We selected these countries because of their very different socio-technical and 
policy/regulatory settings and diverse attitudes towards CCS (Article IV). This 
made our sample more representative on larger scales. In each country, we 
interviewed individuals from a governmental body, an NGO, a research 
centre/institute and an energy or oil company. They provided an overview of the 
ways in which the stakeholders perceive the risks involved in CCS. I focused on 
several flagship projects in different countries such as Mongstad in Norway, Meri-
Pori in Finland and Schwarze Pumpe in Germany. We discuss details of the 
interviews and the case studies in Article IV. In addition, I observed policy and 
legislative development of the technology which can be interpreted as the reaction 
of elites and experts to CCS.  
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Figure 5. Countries included in the analyses 
 
      Moreover, literature review and analysis of the earlier empirical research were 
part of this study. In line with that, I performed desk research on cultural theories, 
cross-cultural dimensions and surveys. 
Table 1. Primary data sources of the dissertation 
Data Description  Quantity Cases 
Public survey  Special 
Eurobarometer 364: 
Public Awareness 
and Acceptance of 
CO2 
capture and storage 
Fieldwork dates: 
9.2.2011-4.3.2011 
N=13901 
respondents 
 
12 countries 
Interviews Representative of 
governmental 
19 in-depth 
interviews 
3 countries 
bodies, NGOs, 
research institutes 
and companies 
Fieldwork dates: 
2012-2013 
Scores of cross-
cultural 
dimensions 
Hofstede 2001; 
Hofstede et al. 
2010; Minkov 2013 
6 dimensions 81 countries 
Observation of 
policy and 
legislative 
development of the 
technology 
For instance: Global 
CCS Institute 
2016b; 2015; 2014; 
2013; 2012. 
IEA 2015; 2016. 
Nordic CCS 
Roadmap 2015; 
NORDICCS, 2016 
Various sources  Global 
Literature review  Various sources See the reference 
lists of the articles 
and the summary 
N/A 
Survey of cultural 
theories  
Various sources See the reference 
lists of the articles 
and the summary 
N/A 
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4 RESULTS AND FINDINGS  
In this chapter, I present an overview of the main results of the four articles 
according to the objectives of the dissertation. In addition, this chapter 
demonstrates how each article contributes to fulfilment of the objectives. In the 
first section, I present the status of CCS and discuss the importance of its 
understanding. Then, I continue with briefly presenting the results on the impact of 
cross-cultural factors on the risk perception and reactions to the technology. In 
doing so, I demonstrate explicitly how these factors function. Finally, I discuss the 
correlation between risk perception of experts and laypeople who are under a same 
cultural influence.  
4.1 QUO VADIS CCS? 
To have a better understanding of technology, it is essential to know the involved 
actors and to understand their interests. I show the status of CCS in one of the so-
called frontrunner countries and identify the key stakeholders who are engaged in 
the development of CCS and the challenges the technology is faced with (Article I). 
Furthermore, in Article I, our endeavour was to explain how CCS policy and 
regulatory framework and regimes function and how these have developed. The 
development of policy and regulatory frameworks can be interpreted as the reaction 
of elites and experts to CCS. I used the proposed taxonomy of the stakeholders to 
study experts’ risk perceptions (Article IV). 
      CCS is often considered to be one of the most controversial topics in the field 
of sustainable energy. Financial issues are one of the barriers to the technology, 
especially the initial investment cost of a project. Thus, it appears that an increase 
in the R&D budget is needed to identify the most cost-effective process for 
capturing, transporting and storing CO2. Furthermore, comprehensive management 
and monitoring systems are essential, due to the large number of stakeholders who 
are engaged in a CCS project.  
      Currently, the tendency of governments and industries to support short-term 
research activities more than long-term ones, along with a slight reduction of fossil-
fuel energy consumption caused by the development of renewable energy, have 
resulted in the de-prioritisation of CCS and, hence, the postponement and 
cancellation of projects. In the past, an ‘over-optimism’ about the technology 
existed, which led to the negligence of important negative factors. As a result, some 
uncertainties related to the technology have still not been addressed sufficiently. 
Over-optimism has led officials to neglect barriers such as underestimation of CO2 
capture cost, the shift of priorities in the private sector (orienting towards 
applications such as sand-tars, deep-offshore gas and oil exploitation), research 
gaps in technology implementation (capture process, energy efficiency) and public 
acceptance. Moreover, the unstable price of fossil fuels during recent years is 
another hindrance to CCS. In addition, the lack of investment from industry is a 
matter of concern. Due to the economic recession of the past decade, industrial 
actors were forced to turn to other shorter-term and more profitable projects.  
      In conclusion, it appears that the situation for CCS technology implementation 
is more difficult than ten years ago. It seems that the regulatory framework for 
CCS, along with carbon policies and lack of social acceptability, are the main 
factors hindering large-scale diffusion of the technology. Moreover, energy 
demand for CO2 capture seems to be one of the biggest problems that research 
institutes have to address.  
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4.2 CROSS-CULTURAL DIVERSITY IN CCS RISK 
PERCEPTION: AN OVERVIEW  
In Articles II, III and IV, I show the importance of national culture in line with the 
other factors that have been identified in the literature and how it affects risk 
perception compared to the other factors. In Articles II and III, I study general 
public risk perception of CCS and show that ‘hierarchical’ nations that have high 
uncertainty avoidance are seemingly less likely to accept CCS technology. In 
contrast, ‘feminine’ nations characterised by social harmony are expected to have a 
lesser level of risk perception to a technology that could increase the long-term 
quality of life, while ‘masculine’ societies characterised by social mastery 
presumably tend to a growing economy that is likely to result in the deterioration of 
the environment. ‘Indulgent’ nations ought to be less risk averse towards CCS.  
     I developed a model based on our analysis (Article III) that could explain how 
different factors affect the perception of CCS in a country (Figure 6). According to 
this model, national culture has control on both knowledge and risk indices. 
Moreover, the indices are influenced by related knowledge. Individual socio-
demographic factors (e.g., age and education) directly affect knowledge.  
      Article IV lends support to the assertions of Inderberg and Wettestad (2015) 
and Jasanoff (1987; 2012) that the risk perceptions of experts can be influenced by 
stakeholders’ cultural orientation, attitudes and views, which themselves can reflect 
collective constructs. The culture of a country also affects the discourse about the 
production of policy-relevant knowledge. Moreover, cross-cultural comparison can 
help explain the risk perceptions in different political cultures and why resistance 
exists to the acceptance of particular forms of technological change. Nonetheless, 
in-depth, systematic understanding of how experts’ cultural orientation is reflected 
in risk perception of CCS needs further research.  
 
  
Figure 6. Factors affecting the perception of CCS 
      Comparison of the risk perceptions of different groups of expert stakeholders 
shows variance across countries. The greatest variety in risk perceptions is among 
NGOs in Germany and Norway, as their positions are at two extremes. Norwegian 
NGOs support CCS deployment as a means to address the risks of climate change, 
whereas German NGOs were severely sceptical about both the technology and 
those who promote and develop CCS. Scientists in Germany perceive the major 
risks to be associated with storage, while scientists in Norway perceive the major 
risks to be associated with capture technologies. Interestingly, our analysis in 
Article I verifies that one of the main concerns of the stakeholders in Norway is 
about amines-based CO2 capture technology due to its possible adverse health 
impact. The risk perceptions of private stakeholders are more homogenous than the 
other stakeholders. Private stakeholders perceived the major risks to be connected 
with the realisation of CCS projects, which might be impacted by factors such as 
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the commercialisation of technology, high costs for deployment, policy uncertainty 
and the lack of demonstration projects and support schemes. The state of CCS 
development in Finland is uncertain; neither motivation for nor opposition to CCS 
deployment exists among most of the stakeholders in Finland. The results of article 
IV on experts’ perceptions of CCS are largely in accord with Shackley et al. 
(2009).  
4.3 ‘AND AFTER ALL WE'RE ONLY ORDINARY MEN6‘ 
Interestingly, when comparing the results of laypeople (Articles II & III) and 
experts (Article IV), it seems that similarities exist between risk and benefit 
perceptions of experts (of my case studies) and laypeople in the countries (Figure 
7), conceivably influenced by their cultural orientations (Douglas and Wildavsky 
1983; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Verweij et al., 2011). In addition, this is 
consistent with Jasanoff (1987) and Johnson and Covello (1987) who argue that 
‘experts are themselves culture bound’ and they share the basic characteristics with 
laypeople as both are influenced by the same social and cultural factors. For 
instance, Germany is a relatively hierarchical, highly long-term oriented, and 
masculine society with high uncertainty avoidance, which are all factors that could 
lead to high risk perception (Articles II and III).  
                                                          
6 From the lyrics ‘Us and Them’ The Pink Floyd (Waters and Wright, 1973)  
 Figure 7. Cross-cultural scores for three case studies (data source: Hofstede et al. 2010) 
     The evidence of discourse analysis on experts (Article IV) and, for example, 
Braun (2017) and Eurobarometer (2012), provide support for the hypothesis that 
homogenously strong opposition exists among the experts and laypeople in a given 
country. For example, when German people were asked if CCS is an effective way 
to tackle climate change, only 23% of respondents perceived CCS as an effective 
technology (Eurobarometer 2012). Moreover, only 10% of the respondents 
believed that they would benefit from CCS deployment (ibid). Both numbers are 
the lowest percentages among the studied countries. In addition, the majority of 
German respondents (81%) were concerned about the possible impact of CCS 
deployment on the environment; this is the highest percentage among the other 
countries (ibid). Braun (2017) shows that ‘strong’ public opposition exists against 
CCS in Germany. Similarly, a common understanding existed among the German 
experts interviewed: CCS is not a useful technology. Only a couple of the experts 
very tentatively expressed that CCS might be useful just for the industrial sectors 
such as cement and steel industries. For instance, a German scientist mentioned: 
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      ‘I think the people should be more intelligent than to put a lot of tons of waste 
[CO2] under the earth for a long time... I think there should be more wise ways 
to produce energy than [CCS]. So, we should concentrate more on renewable 
energy systems in the long run.’  
     Even an interviewee from an NGO believed that debates around bio-CCS are a 
‘hoax’.  
     In stark contrast to Germany, I observed a low-level of risk perception among 
both laypeople and experts in Norway. My theory predicts that the low level of risk 
perceived in societies like Norway is attributable to the significantly feminine and 
short-term oriented culture with the tendency for low uncertainty avoidance in 
addition to other socio-economic and geographical factors (Articles I, II and III). 
CCS social acceptability in Norway is one of the highest among the other European 
countries (Articles III, IV). I observed a very low level of risk perception and high 
level of support among experts in Norway (Article IV; Shackley et al. 2009). The 
results of Article I lend support to this, where we reported ‘over-optimism’ exists 
among the majority of stakeholders. This led to even some miscalculation about 
planning of CCS projects in Norway. Moreover, these results are in accord with 
Haug and Stigson (2016), who claim very positive attitudes to CCS exist in 
Norway on different societal and political levels. For instance, one of the 
interviewees asserted:  
  ‘If you do not take CCS seriously, you do not take climate change seriously.’ 
     Another interviewee believed that CCS should be implemented on a large scale 
soon: 
 ‘It is a matter of when, not if.’ 
     Finally, one of the interviewees mentioned that: 
‘It is kind of naive to think that we can do without CCS [in tackling climate    
change], especially when we look at the current situation in which fossil fuel 
usage increases year by year’. 
     In Finland, the majority of experts who were interviewed showed a rather low 
level of risk perception (Article IV). Regarding bio-CCS and mineral carbonation, I 
observed an especially positive understanding and supportive views among the 
experts:  
‘At the moment if you want to reduce CO2 emissions properly, say, at coal  
power stations or in coal-intensive industries, in practice the only possibility 
is CCS.’ 
     However, some of the interviewees mentioned that that CCS is not an option for 
Finland: 
‘We can reach low-emission level without CCS.’ 
     In Articles II and III, we showed that risk perception of Finnish laypeople also 
roughly follows a similar trend as the experts described above; according to 
Eurobarometer (2012), Finland’s risk perception and the level of worries were one 
of the lowest among the other countries.  
     Notwithstanding I briefly touch upon the controversial concept of NIMBY7 in 
Articles II and III, I argue that simple NIMBYism is not sufficiently explanatory. I 
would like to acknowledge that care should also be taken not to simply explicate 
the complex phenomenon of locals’ risk perception by relating it to proximity or a 
drop in value of real estate in a causal manner.  Nonetheless, as discussed in 
Section 2.1.3, due to the discussion in several socio-psychological studies on CCS 
and energy about NIMBY, local residents’ economic losses and decreases in real 
                                                          
7 For instance, Burningham (2000) Wolsink (2006) firmly ask to stop using the NIMBY argument in scientific 
research. In contrast, while expressing their criticisms about the NIMBY concept, Schively (2007) and van der 
Horst (2007) verify and recognise the role of NIMBYism, and van der Horst (2007) claim that proximity has 
strong influence on the public.  
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estate value, we only touched upon the issue in the articles through the cultural lens 
as one factor among others (insofar as we agree that NIMBY and proximity 
arguments are valid at all). In view of the fact that, for instance, ter Mors et al. 
(2012) identify ‘declines in property value’ and call for their further research as 
concerns of local residents, suggesting that cultural differences may have a role in 
effectiveness of compensation. Furthermore, by making reference to Cultural 
Theory, Krause et al. (2014) verify the role of culture in CCS NIMBYism. Terwel 
et al. (2013) suggest further research to investigate why NIMBY sentiments arise in 
response to CCS deployment.  
     To conclude, I do not claim that cross-cultural factors are a panacea for 
understanding the complex issue of risk perception and reactions to the technology. 
However, the evidence from this study provides strong support for the hypothesis 
that paying attention to cross-cultural factors, while considering the other factors as 
well, should provide an advantage in the study or planning of CCS projects. 
Consideration of cultural factors may facilitate anticipation of the stakeholders’ 
challenges of the technology. Nonetheless, the results of the dissertation have 
limitations and caveats, which I discuss in the following chapter. 
5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
Why does culture matter? This study describes how people perceive CCS 
technology and consequently how social acceptability of CCS emerges, which 
together could help concerned stakeholders (such as policymakers) understand how 
people in a given society might react to the technology. I show that the cultural 
orientation of a country plays an important role in risk perception and public 
understanding of CCS in parallel with knowledge about the technology and climate 
change, trust in stakeholders and political and socio-economic factors. My results 
are in accord with Evar (2012) and Warren et al. (2014), who confirm the role of 
cultural orientations in the perception of CCS. In my study, however, I move 
beyond these conclusions by specifying cross-cultural dimensions and their 
influences. Moreover, my analysis suggests that some of the factors discussed in 
other studies on perception, acceptance, acceptability and reactions about CCS 
could fall under the umbrella of national culture, as it is likely that culture affects 
factors such as trust. Cross-cultural differences and the lack of consideration and 
understanding of these differences have caused failures in the negotiation or 
implementation of some projects. Based on the analysis, I developed a framework 
to predict the reaction of people to the deployment of CCS. Nonetheless, other 
factors exist that play roles in risk perception and shaping reactions of the public to 
CCS deployment in one way or another. These include demographic and socio-
economic factors, place attachment, identity, trust in decision makers and political 
factors.   
     The first research question of the dissertation was: how does national culture 
influence the risk and benefit perceptions of CCS? I have specified how cultural 
orientations and their characteristics shape the perception of CCS technology and 
influence the reactions of the general public. Hierarchical nations that have high 
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uncertainty avoidance have a tendency for a higher level of risk perception whereas 
feminine and indulgent nations ought to have a lower level of risk perception of the 
technology. These cultural factors are connected to trust towards decision makers 
and other actors, and thus the exact pathways between these issues should be the 
focus of further research. 
     The second question was: to what extent do cross-cultural factors predict the 
public reaction to the implementation of CCS? It is difficult to conclude that 
cultural orientation alone can with high reliability predict public reactions to a CCS 
project. Nevertheless, it gives us a decent estimation. Moreover, the framework I 
present could be a tool in the planning toolkit for stakeholders to operationalise risk 
perception by utilising culture when dealing with the risks and uncertainties of a 
new energy technology such as CCS.  
    The last question of this dissertation was: how do expert concerns and risk 
perceptions of CCS projects differ across countries? Scientific evidence shows that 
a noticeable variety in risk perceptions of experts are influenced by several factors, 
including social, political and technical settings for the deployment of technology 
in each country (Inderberg and Wettestad 2015). However, these are not the only 
factors influencing risk perceptions. Social and cultural factors of stakeholders, 
which can reflect ‘collective constructs’ can also influence their risk perception 
(Douglas and Wildavsky 1983; Jasanoff 1987). The culture of a country also 
affects the discourse about production of policy-relevant knowledge (Jasanoff 
2012). Moreover, cross-cultural comparison helps explain risk perceptions in 
different political cultures and why resistance exist to particular forms of 
technological change (ibid). However, an in-depth understanding on how experts’ 
cultural orientations reflect in risk perceptions of CCS in a systematic manner 
needs further research.  
     My analysis suggests that the risk perception of CCS technology is the highest 
among the German experts. Their concerns are mainly attributable to factors such 
as distrust of politicians and their energy policy, as the experts were suspicious of 
politicians’ relationships with the coal lobby. The experts questioned the need for 
CCS projects, because they believed that alternatives such as renewable energy 
could also reduce GHG emissions. In Finland and Norway, I observed a lower level 
of risk perception of CCS. According to the experts, the major barriers to CCS 
deployment in these countries were not opposition, but concerns over the lack of 
financial incentives, clear policy and storage sites. Moreover, ambiguous policy in 
Finland is another major barrier. Finnish interviewees recommended that CCS 
could be deployed in specific cases such as bio-CCS and mineral carbonisation or 
for the steel industry. Norway has the strongest support for CCS, in comparison to 
the other case studies among both experts and laypeople. CCS is perceived as a 
vital technology in Norway. This is evident in the results of the FIS analysis in 
Article I: the postponement of a CCS flagship project, the so-called ‘moon-landing 
project’, was considered as a scandal for the Norwegian government.  
     To summarise, in countries where opposition to CCS is strong, like Germany, 
risk perceptions of experts can be driven by factors such as the lack of trust and 
doubts about the need for the project. In countries with a lesser opposition, 
however, such as Finland, risk perceptions are conceivably more connected with 
the risk for investment.  
     I observed similarities between risk perception of laypeople and experts, who 
are under the same cultural influences. Nonetheless, it seems that laypeople have 
fairly ambivalent feelings yet volatile opinions towards the technology. Thus, their 
risk perception should be malleable depending on their cultural orientations, in 
addition to other factors such as providing more information and trust. The 
influence of the other factors that influence perception of both laypeople and 
experts are evident in the regression model (Article III) and the discourse analysis 
(Article IV).  
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     Finally, as I argued in Article IV, a variety in risk perceptions could be 
influenced by several factors, including socio-economic, political, geographical, 
historical and technical settings for the deployment of the technology in each 
country. However, one way or another, the aforementioned factors also construct 
and shape the culture of a country within aeon. For instance, other than cultural 
features, I argue that a few factors influence the perception of CCS in Norway in a 
positive direction. These include the geographical location, which enables the 
country to have offshore storage, as well as strong oil lobbies and significant 
national revenue from fossil fuel-based industries. The latter two factors might be 
reasons for the fact that policymakers from fossil fuel-possessing countries are 
more in favour of CCS (Articles I and II). To support my argument, I recall one of 
the main conclusions of Article I: ‘Norway’s powerful oil and gas industries hold a 
key role in the direct influencing of CCS policies’. Moreover, in Article I, my co-
authors and I argue that how the national economy has positively influenced 
decision-making and the approach of the Norwegian government to CCS. 
Nonetheless, the landscape analysis shows that the unprotected market niche of 
CCS is vulnerable to radical changes in the price of fossil fuels, which negatively 
influence authorities’ decision about the technology (Article I).  
     In contrast, in Germany, other important factors exist that influence a high-risk 
perception of CCS in addition to the cultural features, such as political and 
geographical settings of the country (Braun, 2017). For example, Germany has a 
long history of public protests against infrastructure siting, such as nuclear energy 
or waste disposal, which influences the perception of CCS (Article IV). In addition, 
Green politics have deep roots in Germany, with opposition to technologies with 
hazardous siting controversies at the top of their environmental agenda (Burchell, 
2002).   
 
 
5.1 CONTRIBUTION TO NEW KNOWLEDGE  
This research was an exploratory and empirical study that aimed to demonstrate 
how socio-cultural factors affect risk perceptions of and reactions to CCS. To my 
knowledge, this is the first study that explicitly operationalises risk perceptions of 
CCS by utilising cross-cultural dimensions and shows the consequences of cultural 
orientations. My aim was to show how culture influences and shapes risk 
perception, and to do so in a pragmatic and comprehensive way, guiding not only 
scholars but also policymakers and the general public. Nonetheless, the macro-level 
model I have developed would be inappropriate for use in isolation in individual 
projects, because the social factors involved are much more nuanced than just 
national culture. However, for stakeholders, the model can point out from where 
social responses to their actions are likely to arise. Thus, alongside the other factors 
such as providing information and trust, the existing cultural framework should be 
taken into consideration. The cross-cultural dimensions could be a good starting 
point for exploring the complex relationship between public reactions to new 
technologies, the characteristics of individuals and macro-level societal effects. 
     This dissertation contributes new knowledge. The way I approached and utilised 
cultural dimensions is novel, not least in their application to predicting risk 
perception of CCS. Before this research, insufficient knowledge existed on the 
relationship between the pattern of risk perception and macro-level cultural factors 
affecting risk perception across the world. In the majority of the literature, culture 
is broadly discussed. In this dissertation, I demonstrate that macro-scale cultural 
issues are one explanatory factor in how individuals perceive the risks and benefits 
of new technologies in a society. I show explicitly that the dimensions of national 
culture have consequences for CCS development beyond the level of local 
communities immediately affected by projects. Projects are embedded in larger 
cultural contexts, and countries with different social settings need to be accounted 
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for when developing an understanding of the relationship between risk perception 
and the acceptability of CCS technology.  
     Furthermore, by demonstrating the current concerns and perceptions of experts 
about CCS and the similarities in risk perception of laypeople in different 
countries, I paved the way for future studies to investigate the interrelation of 
laypeople and experts who are under the same cultural influences.  
     Finally, I introduced a framework that I believe could be a suitable analytical 
measure to operationalise risk perception in other cases, especially those related to 
climate change. 
5.2 POLICY IMPLICATIONS  
This research contributed to CCS risk governance. The analytical framework I have 
introduced in this study provides a toolkit for project planning. Policymakers, 
authorities, energy companies and other stakeholders can benefit from the 
framework to operationalise risk perception by utilising the overlooked issue of 
cultural orientation when dealing with the risks and uncertainties of a new energy 
technology such as CCS. The unique strength of the framework originates in the 
fact that national specifications weigh considerably in the planning and resource 
allocation by international organisations. For instance, the European Commission 
might plausibly benefit from the framework when considering its budget allocation 
and communication with member states to study CCS projects and in estimating 
the failure or success of a project. Furthermore, cross-cultural differences and the 
lack of their consideration have caused failures in negotiations or implementation 
of some projects. For instance, reaching a binding agreement in The United 
Nations Climate Change Conferences (COP) seems to be something of a chimera, 
and I argue that one of the reasons might be the negligence of cultural differences 
between member nations.  
 
5.3 LIMITATIONS AND CAVEATS  
Although I discussed the limitations of each article separately, here I present the 
caveats and limitations of the dissertation as a whole.  
     National-level correlations do not reveal the social mechanisms of benefit and 
risk perceptions or the processes by which they arise, although they do show 
interesting patterns that could explain perceptions about CCS projects to some 
extent. In other words, local contingencies that may prove fatal to a project are 
easily overlooked when applying coarse cultural indicators such as those 
introduced here. Thus, the initial macro-level model of this study should not be 
utilised in isolation in individual projects, because the social factors involved are 
much more nuanced than just national culture. Thus, only alongside other factors 
(such as providing information, trust and the socio-political setting) should the 
existing cultural framework be taken into consideration.  
     In addition, my quantitative analysis has two weaknesses. These were the small 
number of countries and challenges of measurement. Regarding the latter 
weakness, cross-cultural surveys work well when attitudes, values and opinions are 
easily translated or the measurements are validated in each country (or both). This 
is rarely the case for contested issues such as novel technologies. Thus, differences 
in the results of survey comparisons of CCS can arise as much from acceptance 
definitions associated with national cultures as from the general acceptance 
believed to be measured. This is also a limitation of my methodological approach; 
here I used survey questions with low-resolution scales that were not directly 
developed to be measures of the latent components we found. As mentioned earlier 
in this dissertation, it should also be recognised that not even CCS opinions but 
also CO2 knowledge are volatile so that an actual ‘real’ or ‘true’ opinion does not 
exist. All we have are just projected opinions at the time of surveying. This is a 
hindrance for far-reaching conclusions about the effects of national cultural factors 
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on risk perception. Indeed, one cannot exclude the possibility that opinions might 
change over time. Thus, it is likely that Eurobarometer data are based on labile 
opinions that are likely to change due to some other known and unknown factors. 
This is a notable challenge facing my results. 
     Additionally, the unequal number of interviews in different countries and 
language barriers (the interviewees were speaking English, which is likely not the 
first language of the interviewees) are considered as another limitation of the study. 
     Finally, the use of asymmetric and non-homogenous research methods and data 
for both parts of my study (i.e., laypeople and experts) could challenge my results 
and is thus one of the major limitations of this study.  
5.4 FUTURE RESEARCH  
CCS was the subject of this research. The technology is limited geographically to a 
few countries. Nevertheless, I suggest that utilising cultural factors in addition to 
the other factors is something of a sine qua non in the study of social aspects of 
technology and risk perception. It is therefore recommended to operationalise a 
similar framework for worldwide phenomena such as climate change. Moreover, 
further research is needed to replicate the results of the dissertation for the same or 
broader cases. In contrast to much of the mainstream research on risk perception, 
my hypothesis is that both laypeople and experts are affected by similar cultural 
factors and therefore might have similar risk perceptions. In other words, their 
model of thought may follow a similar pattern in a particular society. Thus, further 
comparative research is needed to examine the hypothesis in a systematic manner 
to understand whether or not the risk perception of experts and the general public 
within the same culture differ from each other. If the risk perception of experts and 
the public would be shown to be similar due to the same cultural orientation, then 
future research on social acceptability and social acceptance of technology might 
change fundamentally.  
     Hofstede’s dimensions worked well in my study; I utilised these dimensions for 
risk perceptions and in particular to specify how different cultural behaviours 
influence and shape risk perception. However, I also recommend replicating the 
findings of the dissertation on laypeople by using other cross-cultural studies, such 
as those presented in Appendix 2. I suggest the GLOBE project as a good starting 
point, as it is updated and one of the latest cross-cultural studies. One may even 
consider using the broader cultural groups suggested by Maleki and de Jong 
(2014). In any case, testing the framework presented in this dissertation with 
another set of cultural dimensions would be worthwhile to confirm the role of 
national macro-culture.  
     Finally, the landscape aspect of the Multi-Level Perspective (MLP) that I used 
in Article I is a worthwhile avenue for cross-cultural theoretical researchers to 
investigate how culture changes in a society, and consequently, to explore effects 
of the change on risk perception of the technology.
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APPENDIX 1: MAJOR CONCEPTUAL AND 
QUALITATIVE CULTURAL STUDIES  
(Adapted from Maleki and de Jong (2014) with permission) 
 
Cultural theory Dimensions 
Parsons  
(Parsons and Shils 1951) 
1) Affectivity (need gratification) vs. Affective 
Neutrality (restraint of impulses) 
2) Self-orientation vs. Collectivity-Orientation 
3) Universalism (applying general standards) vs. 
Particularism (taking particular relationships into 
account) 
4) Ascription (judging others by who they are) vs. 
Achievement (judging them by what they do) 
5) Specificity (limiting relations to others to 
specific spheres) vs. Diffuseness (no prior 
limitations to nature of relations) 
Kluckhohn 
(Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck 
1961) 
 
 
 
1) Human Nature Orientation: what is the 
character of innate human nature? (evil - mixed - 
good) 
2) Man-Nature Orientation: what is the relation 
of man to nature (and super nature)? (subjugation 
- harmony - mastery) 
3) Time Orientation: what is the temporal focus 
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of human life? (past - present - future) 
4) Activity Orientation: what is the modality of 
human activity? (being - becoming - doing) 
5) Relational Orientation: what is the modality of 
man’s relationship to other people? (lineality 
(hierarchical) - collaterality - individualism) 
Hall 
(Hall 1966; 1990)  
  
1) Context (Low vs. High): extent to which the 
context of a message is as important as message 
itself 
2) Space (Small vs. Large Distance): extent to 
which people are comfortable sharing physical 
space with others 
3) Time (Monochronic vs. Polychronic): extent to 
which people approach one task vs. multiple tasks 
at a time 
Douglas  
(Douglas 1973) 
1) Group: degree of incorporation into a bounded 
social unit 
2) Grid: degree to which interactions are 
constrained by position-specific rules 
Triandis  
(Triandis 1989; 2002) 
1) Complexity: cultural uniformity and 
conformity is higher in simple cultures and lower 
in complex cultures 
2) Tightness vs. Looseness: tight or loose rules, 
norms and ideas about what is correct behaviour 
in different situations 
3) Individualism vs. Collectivism: self as 
dependent on or interdependent with some in-
group 
4) Vertical vs. Horizontal: accepting hierarchy vs. 
equality as a given 
5) Active vs. Passive: changing the environment 
vs. changing themselves to fit into environment 
6) Universalism vs. Particularism: treat others on 
the basis of universal criteria vs. relationships 
7) Diffuse vs. Specific: judging an individual in a 
holistic manner vs. discerning different roles 
8) Ascription vs. Achievement: judge others on 
the basis of ascribed attributes vs. achieved 
attributes 
9) Instrumental vs. Expressive: priority and 
importance of instrumental relationships vs. 
social relationships 
10) Emotional Expression vs. Suppression: 
express emotions freely vs. control the expression 
of emotion 
Trompenaars 
(Trompenaars and Hampden-
Turner 1997) 
1) Universalism vs. Particularism: what is more 
important; rules or relationships? 
2) Individualism vs. Collectivism: do people 
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 derive their identity from within themselves or 
from their group? 
3) Specific vs. Diffuse: are an individual’s various 
roles compartmentalised or integrated? 
4) Neutral vs. Affective: are people free to express 
their emotions or are they restrained? 
5) Achievement vs. Ascription: how are people 
accorded respect and social status? 
6) Sequential vs. Synchronic: do people do things 
one at a time or several things at once? 
7) Internal vs. External Control: do people 
control the environment or does it control them? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2: QUANTITATIVE CROSS-
CULTURAL STUDIES  
 
(Adapted with permission from Maleki and de Jong (2014) with my compilation) 
Cultural 
theory 
Dimensions 
Hofstede 
(Hofstede 
2001)  
1) Individualism vs. Collectivism:  Individualism refers to a 
society in which the ties between individuals are loose: a 
person is expected to look after themselves and their 
immediate family only. Collectivism refers to a society in 
which people from birth onwards are integrated into strong, 
cohesive in-groups, which continue to protect them 
throughout their lifetime.  
2) Power Distance: the extent to which the less powerful 
members of society expect and accept that power is 
distributed unequally. 
3) Uncertainty Avoidance: the extent to which members of 
society feel uncomfortable with uncertain, unknown, 
ambiguous, or unstructured situations. The fundamental issue 
here is how a society deals with the fact that the future can 
never be known. 
4) Masculinity vs. Femininity: Masculinity refers to a 
preference in society for achievement, competition, heroism, 
assertiveness and material reward for success. Femininity 
refers to a preference for cooperation, consensus, modesty, 
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caring for the weak and quality of life. This dimension is also 
related to the division of emotional roles between women and 
men. 
5) Long vs. Short-term Orientation: Long-term Orientation 
refers to a society that fosters virtues and is oriented towards 
future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. Short-
term orientation refers to a society that fosters virtues related 
to the past and present, in particular respect for tradition, 
preservation of ‘face’, and fulfilling social obligations. 
Minkov 
(Minkov 
2007) 
1) Exclusionism vs. Universalism: Exclusionism is defined as 
the cultural tendency to treat people on the basis of their 
group affiliation and reserve favours, services, privileges for 
in-groups while excluding out-groups from those who deserve 
such privileged treatment. Universalism is the opposite 
cultural tendency; treating people primarily on the basis of 
who they are as individuals and disregarding their group 
affiliation. 
2) Monumentalism vs. Flexumility (Self-Effacement): 
Monumentalism refers to pride and high self-regard, 
demonstration of status and generosity with money, favours 
and services, consistency between feelings and outward 
expression and avoidance of dialectical feelings and thoughts, 
including greater religiousness. Flexumility (Flexibility + 
Humility) is characterised by the opposite characteristics. 
3) Indulgence vs. Restraint: Indulgence is defined as a 
tendency to allow relatively free gratification of some desire 
and feelings (leisure, casual sex, spending and consumption). 
Restraint refers to the tendency to curb the gratification of 
desires and feelings by strict social norms and prohibitions. 
Inglehart 
(Inglehart et 
al. 2004; 
Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005) 
1) Traditional vs. Secular-Rational Values:  In traditional 
cultures, religion is very important and the main goal in most 
people’s lives is to make their parents proud; they idealise 
large families and have large numbers of children. They also 
have high levels of national pride, favour more respect for 
authority and reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia and suicide. 
Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite 
preferences on all these topics. 
2) Survival vs. Self-Expression: Self-expression dimension 
reflects a syndrome of tolerance, trust, emphasis on subjective 
well-being, civic activism and self-expression that emerges in 
post-industrial societies with high levels of existential security 
and individual autonomy. At the opposite pole, people in 
societies shaped by existential insecurity and rigid intellectual 
and social constraints on human autonomy tend to emphasise 
economic and physical security above all. 
Schwartz 
(Schwartz 
1999) 
1) Embeddedness (Conservatism):  cultural emphasis on 
maintenance of the status quo, propriety and restraint of 
actions or inclinations that might disrupt the solidarity group 
or the traditional order (embedded value items: social order, 
respect for tradition, security, obedience, wisdom). 
2) Intellectual Autonomy: cultural emphasis on the 
desirability of individuals independently pursuing their own 
ideas and intellectual directions (embedded value items: 
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curiosity, broadmindedness, creativity). 
3) Affective Autonomy: cultural emphasis on the desirability 
of individuals independently pursuing affectively positive 
experience (embedded value items: pleasure, exciting life, 
varied life). 
4) Hierarchy: cultural emphasis on the legitimacy of an 
unequal distribution of power, roles and resources (embedded 
value items: social power, authority, humility, wealth). 
5) Egalitarianism: cultural emphasis on transcendence of 
selfish interests in favour of voluntary commitment to 
promoting the welfare of others (embedded value items: 
equality, social justice, freedom, responsibility, honesty). 
6) Mastery: cultural emphasis on getting ahead through active 
self-assertion (ambition, success, courage, competence). 
7) Harmony: cultural emphasis on fitting harmoniously into 
the social and natural environment (unity with nature, 
protecting the environment, world of beauty). 
GLOBE 
(House et al. 
2002) 
1) Performance Orientation: the extent to which an 
organisation or society encourages and rewards group 
members for performance improvement and excellence. 
2) Future Orientation: the degree to which individuals in 
organisations or societies engage in future-oriented behaviour 
such as planning, investing in the future, and delaying 
gratification. 
3) Gender Egalitarianism: the extent to which an organisation 
or a society minimises gender role differences and gender 
discrimination. 
4) Assertiveness: the degree to which individuals in 
organisations or societies are assertive, confrontational and 
aggressive in social relationships. 
5) Institutional Collectivism: the degree to which 
organisational and societal institutional practices encourage 
and reward collective distribution of resources and collective 
action. 
6) In-group Collectivism: the degree to which individuals 
express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organisations 
or families. 
7) Power Distance: the degree to which members of an 
organisation or society expect and agree that power should be 
unequally shared. 
8) Humane Orientation: the degree to which individuals in 
organisations or societies encourage and reward individuals 
for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, caring, and kind 
to others. 
9) Uncertainty Avoidance: the extent to which members of an 
organisation or society strive to avoid uncertainty by reliance 
on social norms, rituals and bureaucratic practices to alleviate 
the unpredictability of future events. 
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